The experts will be assessing the outcome of the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) for weeks, months, even years to come.  For now, having mulled over its Final Outcome document, I’ll stick with our assessment that the Conference is best described as a “modest success.” 

Very modest. 

That success might best be summed up as follows: the States Parties to the Convention will continue to have yearly meetings between now and the Seventh Review Conference in 2011.  Which means that there may be some hope for progress after the Bush Administration finally departs in January 2009, if the American people decide to elect a President who will engage in, maybe even lead, real diplomacy to forge global responses to global threats.

Until then, we’ll have to muddle through as best we can.  In the BWC context, that means States, intergovernmental organizations, and a wide range of non-state actors will have to find ways to take advantage of annual meetings and other opportunities created by the Review Conference to help advance bioweapons non-proliferation efforts. There will, of course, also be other opportunities outside of the BWC, perhaps most notably UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s proposed UN Forum on biotechnology risks and benefits.

The opportunities within the BWC will regrettably be few, and it will be hard to take advantage of them.  As expected, it is unlikely that there will be recurring topics, beyond universalization, at the annual meetings of States Parties.  Thus, even though the obligations of States Parties to the BWC were enumerated in the Final Declaration, there may be little incentive for States Parties to put much effort into meeting these obligations. 

 Moreover, the States Parties failed to agree on an “action plan” to improve national implementation of their obligations under the BWC. This was due to deep divisions over the relationship between non-proliferation and peaceful cooperation (especially including technology transfer) that have plagued the BWC for the past twenty years.  These divisions have only grown more acute as biotechnology has become increasingly important economically.  The UN Forum will not be able to avoid this issue.

Having failed to agree on an action plan, the States Parties also failed to reaffirm some statements, agreed at the Fourth Review Conference and reasserted at the 2003 Meeting of States Parties, of what effective national implementation entails.  For instance, they failed to assert that States Parties should review and update their national implementation measures to ensure that they remain effective, implying that national implementation is a one-off exercise that will be immune to any changes in the world.  They failed to incorporate agreed-on recommendations of 2003 that national implementation should include “regulatory measures,” or that there be “comprehensive and concrete national measures to secure pathogen collections and … [to] control their use.”

Without the action plan and recurring topics, there is less work for the newly agreed upon 3-person Implementation Support Unit (ISU) to do. At least I was wrong about whether the ISU would be eliminated altogether.  As it stands, ISU activities are limited to administrative support (including efforts to promote universalization of the Convention) and facilitating confidence building measure (CBM) submissions.  That said, this includes “supporting, as appropriate, the implementation by the States Parties of the decisions and recommendations” of the Review Conference. The BioWeapons Prevention Project notes, optimistically, that this and other tasks “may allow some flexibility in the operation of the ISU … [all] might be subject to either a broad or narrow interpretation of the mandate.” Since some States Parties will watch the ISU closely to ensure that it does not overstep the mandate they feel it has been given, the ISU and its supporters will have to move carefully fulfill the BWPP’s optimistic hopes.

Meanwhile, the CBMs, which are really the only means currently available to the States Parties as a whole to demonstrate and assess compliance with the treaty, will not be strengthened.  The United States successfully pushed a short-sighted “increase participation first” strategy.  The CBMs were designed twenty years ago and their relevance to contemporary compliance concerns decreases with every year that they are not updated.  It is hard to see what greater participation alone buys. 

In fact, compliance itself suffers in the Final Declaration, which mentions the phrases “compliance” and “non-compliance” only half as often as does the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 (the Fifth Review Conference did not issue a Final Declaration).  Of particular concern to me are two deletions.  First, an appeal to “scientific communities to lend their support only to activities that have justification for prophylactic, protective and other peaceful purposes, and [to] refrain from undertaking or supporting activities which are in breach of the obligations deriving from provisions of the Convention” has inexplicably been removed. Second, the concept that “non-compliance should be treated with determination in all cases, without selectivity or discrimination,” has also been deleted.

The reasons for these deletions are not clear, especially in light of strong statements on the need to “confront non-compliance” that were made by the U.S. during the Review Conference.  “Determination” is precisely what has been lacking in the BWC thus far, though I suppose an argument could be made for deleting a word simply on the basis that States Parties shouldn’t talk about things they aren’t willing to do.  That doesn’t instill much confidence.

As for the deletion of “without selectivity and discrimination,” perhaps we should not be surprised.  This is entirely consistent with current US non-proliferation policy, a central tenet of which is, as Michael Krepon notes in relation to US nuclear weapons policy

that the world remains divided, this time between responsible states— U.S. friends and allies—and evildoers. Because these two camps operate by very different rules, the Bush administration postulated and sought to enforce separate norms for each camp.” Thus, “[t]he Bush team has strongly asserted … that responsible states should retain the right to hold and modernize nuclear weapons, rights that should not be granted to evildoers.

As Krepon shows, such thinking has profoundly hurt nuclear non-proliferation efforts.  If applied to biological non-proliferation efforts, it is likely to do the same.  Krepon is right when he states that “[w]e are wise to distinguish responsible states from dangerous ones by comparing their actions against universal norms; we invite trouble by trying to impose different norms for friends and potential adversaries.”

Given the heady rhetoric, but lack of real attention to compliance issues, it is no surprise that the Review Conference did not agree on ways to improve mechanisms for investigating allegations of non-compliance.  Nor did it even agree on measures to strengthen investigations of allegations of bioweapons use, or to update or strengthen the UN Secretary General’s investigation mechanism.  The first was too much to expect, even for optimists.  But the second should have been achievable.

So, what are we left with as outcomes of the Review Conference? In addition to agreeing to establish an ISU with a mandate to fulfill certain specific (and perhaps fairly broad) tasks, and to take steps to improve participation in the CBM mechanism, the States Parties agreed to undertake efforts to promote universalization of the treaty. 

The other significant agreement was on the form and content of the annual meetings that will take place from 2007 – 2010.  In terms of form, there will be a one week meeting of States Parties each year (two weeks in 2010, in anticipation of the Seventh Review Conference), prepared by a one week meeting of experts.  In terms of content, the meetings will discuss the following topics:

In 2007:

Ways and means to enhance national implementation, including enforcement of national legislation, strengthening of national institutions and coordination among national law enforcement institutions.

Regional and sub-regional cooperation on BWC implementation.

In 2008:

National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins.

Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim to prevent misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention.

In 2009:

With a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying requirements and requests for capacity enhancement, and (2) from States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, opportunities for providing assistance related to these fields.

In 2010:

Provision of assistance and coordination with relevant organizations upon request by any State Party in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, including improving national capabilities for disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis and public health systems.

As noted previously, certain pressing issues, such as transparency of biodefense activities, and investigations of non-compliance, are simply not included. Perhaps even more significantly, the annual meetings won’t be empowered to take binding decisions.  This was one of the main weaknesses of the last round of annual meetings from 2003 – 2005, and one that many States Parties wanted to see corrected.  Our understanding is that the United States was dead set against this idea, however.  As the Arms Control Association’s Olivier Meier noted “over the next five years, discussions without decisions will not be enough to address the threat from bioterrorism and the lack of transparency.”

So, coming out of the Sixth Review Conference, we are left with a decidedly mixed bag.  There is room for discussion, including of some relatively important topics.  And there is the possibility of establishing an effective and useful, if limited, Implementation Support Unit.  But there is no movement (and maybe even backwards movement) on the hard issues of (non-)compliance and resolving North-South tensions.  And beyond the ISU, it is difficult to see how the BWC, and thereby efforts to prevent the development and use of biological weapons, has been strengthened.

 For all of its bluster about non-compliance and national implementation, when it comes to concrete action, the United States has accomplished very little.  Why is this so?  I can only offer the following hypothesis, undoubtedly too simple, but perhaps a basis for further discussion: in the first case because efforts to address compliance would impinge on national sovereignty, and might call into question some US biodefense activities to boot.  In the second case (and also the first?), because the current U.S. aversion to real diplomacy, and its disposition against universal norms, won out over the U.S. desire for real progress.

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The Sixth Review Conference has just publicly released an Informal Advance Copy of the Final Document via the United Nations Office at Geneva’s website.

Our press release on the Review Conference can be found here.

Further analysis will be forthcoming soon.

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As the second to last day of the Sixth Review Conference heads into evening meetings, some aspects of the final outcome are becoming clear.  But deep disagreements over the promotion of peaceful cooperation and scientific and technological exchange remain unresolved.  These disagreements threaten to render the next inter-sessional process ineffectual.

As best as can be determined from outside, key aspects of the next inter-sessional include:

• There will be a one week meeting of experts and a one week meeting of States Parties every year from 2007 – 2010.  In preparation for the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, the meeting of States Parties will be extended to two weeks in 2010.

• The annual meetings will not be empowered to take decisions.

• Several topics may recur at every annual meeting (most likely, the meetings of States Parties): universality, national implementation, confidence building measures, scientific and technological developments, and coordination with other international bodies.  However, we are hearing that there are still debates over how and whether this will occur.  A failure to consider these topics annually would be a major blow to efforts to strengthen the BWC.

• The annual meetings will also consider one specific additional topic.  Seven topics are still under consideration (see here for my previous discussion of these topics).  These will have to be reduced to four, or some meetings will have to consider two topics, which is unlikely given that the meetings of experts will last only one week.  The seven topics are:

• Ways and means to enhance national implementation: including enforcement of national legislation and strengthening of national institutions, and cooperation between courts, police and customs
• Regional and sub-regional cooperation on BWC implementation
• National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins
• oversight to prevent use of research and advances in science and technology for purposes prohibited by the Convention through education, awareness-raising and adoption of codes of conduct.
• Advances in science and technology relevant to the Convention, including prevention of misuse of such advances for illicit or hostile purposes as prohibited by the Convention
• Facilitation of, and removal of restrictions or limitations on, scientific and technological cooperation and exchange, including in the field of biotechnology, for peaceful purposes in pursuance of Article X
• Disease surveillance, and preparedness, response and provision of assistance in the case of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons

• There will likely be an action plan on universalization. Action plans on national implementation and peaceful cooperation remain extremely uncertain.

• There may be a small, three-person implementation support unit – but if there is no action plan on national implementation and no consideration of recurring topics, then one must wonder what the value of the support unit will be.

I fear that the final outcome hinges on whether the States Parties can reach agreement on how to address the issue of peaceful cooperation.  The content of the annual meetings, the work plan, the implementation support unit - all may ride on this outcome.

In an attempt to forge consensus, Ambassador Khan (Pakistan), the President of the Review Conference, offered a “comprehensive implementation action plan” on Tuesday that combined elements of the individual action plans on national implementation and Article X that had been proposed last week.  The BioWeapons Prevention Project reports that on Wednesday

The proposal … for a single action plan on comprehensive implementation was the subject of vigorous debate. Some States Parties have indicated that they do not wish to see so many elements relating to Article X (which relates to peaceful uses of the biological sciences) in an action plan they saw as important for dealing with problems of national implementation. Other States Parties indicated that if Article X issues were not covered they may not see the value in an action plan on national implementation. By the evening, there did not appear to be an easy path to follow to bring these two perspectives together.

Not good.  By tying the two action plans together, the final outcome may well be that there is no action plan at all (or no action plan that has real meaning).  Already the annual meetings won’t be empowered to take decisions, reducing the incentive to consider recurring topics every year.  Without a meaningful action plan, there may be even less incentive for considering recurring topics.  And without an action plan on national implementation, there will be less incentive to have an implementation support unit.

Add to this the fact that, by allowing only one week meetings of experts, the States Parties have probably constrained the number of individual topics for annual meetings to four.  This means not only that they won’t address some pressing issues, but also that some of the more substantial topics that remain, like preventing the misuse of advances in S&T, will likely be dropped.  If this worst case scenario of no action plan, no recurring topics, no implementation support unit, and few significant annual meeting topics comes to pass, the net result would be an outcome that makes little, if any progress over the last inter-sessional process.

It’s hard to see how such an outcome could be characterized as successful, whatever the diplomats and public relations spin masters say. But as far as I can tell, the U.S. and at least some NAM nations are willing to accept failure.  I hope they prove me wrong.

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The Review Conference has entered the final stretch – and evening meetings are now on the schedule.  The amount of information coming out from behind the closed doors is decreasing, but what information there is suggests that negotiations remain intense.

“Article X remains the key outstanding issue that divides States Parties” writes the BioWeapons Prevention Project today.  BWPP offers another, perhaps more positive take on this issue, which was discussed extensively in my previous blog:

A number of the divisions on Article X stem from differing visions of the role of the BTWC. The differing visions can be divided into two groups which are broadly those which are net exporters of technology and those that are net importers.

One group of States, and these generally have a strong technological base, see the role of the BTWC as primarily one for controlling the spread of potentially harmful materials and technologies, and, while they see Article X as an important part of the Convention, they perceive economic and development issues as being better discussed in other forums.

The other group of States, which generally see scientific and technological development as key to future progress for their countries, have concerns that economic and development issues are not taken seriously enough in international negotiations. To these States, it is important that issues relating to national security do not have a negative impact on economic security or development.

From a slightly different perspective, all States see the benefits of assistance activities which clearly fall within the remit of Article X, such as enhanced disease surveillance, the education of scientists and improvements of biosafety and biosecurity in laboratory facilities.

BWPP also noted yesterday a development which we had overlooked with regard to CBMs:

The draft declaration includes the sentence: ‘The information supplied by a State Party must not be further circulated or made available without the express permission of that State Party’ – a text that comes from a proposal by Russia, the UK and the US (the depositary powers of the BTWC, the latter two of which have published parts of their CBMs).

BWPP notes that CBM returns have been studied by independent researchers.  Indeed, our colleagues at the Hamburg Research Group for Biological Arms Control have been examining them closely for the last couple of years and have written extensively on the topic.  The Sunshine Project has also conducted studies which compare the content of CBM returns to information available through open-sources.

If the proposed wording goes through, these possibilities for outside assessment would be significantly curtailed.  Unless coupled to a serious effort by States Parties to address compliance concerns (which, as we have discussed, is simply not being contemplated), this move may decrease the accountability of States Parties to each other and to their own citizens.

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As the BWC Review Conference ended its second week, negotiators face increasing pressure to arrive at a final outcome that all can accept. A draft final declaration now exists, and negotiations will henceforth focus on specific highlighted problem areas within the text. Reports are that many such problem areas exist, but two stand out above all others: the topics of the 2007 – 2010 inter-sessional meetings, and how to address Article X relating to facilitating peaceful cooperation and peaceful uses of biotechnology. Not surprisingly, these two issues are connected.

On Friday, the BioWeapons Prevention Project reported that eleven possible topics for single inter-sessional meetings were on the table for discussion, together with four potential recurring topics “which could not be expected to be dealt with in a single year as some form of progress report or update may be considered beneficial.” With only four inter-sessional meetings, and with action plans on universality and national implementation to be re-visited every year, it is clear that this list needs to be narrowed down. That’s where there is a lot of tension and debate. These topics are listed here, together with a brief discussion of their limitations.

One of the eleven potential topics is “Facilitation of, and removal of restrictions or limitations on, scientific and technological cooperation and exchange, including in the field of biotechnology, for peaceful purposes in pursuance of Article X.” In addition, the NAM has formally proposed language for an action plan on Article X, analogous to the action plans on universality and national implementation that appear to be moving forward.

However, the Western Group, and the U.S. in particular, does not want to see much discussion of Article X during the inter-sessional process other than the topic of cooperation on infectious disease surveillance, and it will certainly reject any action plan on the issue. It’s clear that many in the NAM do not feel that discussion of infectious disease surveillance alone is good enough. Indeed, the NAM working paper on inter-sessional meetings views that topic as being distinct from the facilitation of “scientific and technological cooperation and exchanges for peaceful purposes in pursuance of Article X.” (It should be said, however, that there are apparently disagreements within the NAM on this issue.)

Some background may help to clarify this issue. Jean Pascal Zanders offers a cogent summary:

The connection between disarmament and development is another source of tension permanently present in the efforts to strengthen the BTWC. … In the 1990s it caused increasing polarization between the developed and developing world. With regard to BW there was a marked shift from disarmament to non-proliferation. … To the industrialized states the shift was uncontroversial, perhaps even natural: since there are no BW to destroy, security policies should aim to prevent technologies that may contribute to BW development and production [from] fall[ing] in the hands of certain state and non-state actors.

Non-proliferation policies are a requirement under Article III of the BTWC; legislative or regulatory measures to implement these policies are required under article IV. The concrete measures, however, are not developed within the treaty framework. The Australia Group is an informal coalition of select states that coordinate technology export control measures and standards among themselves. It is exclusive, as new members have to be invited in. This opaque decision-making and exclusivity generate suspicion about the true intentions among non-participants, who are often developing countries. Developing countries have viewed the emphasis on export controls as yet another attempt by the industrialized world to preserve their economic dominance and technological edge at their expense. The globalizing economy, and the growing importance of biology and biotechnology for economic and societal development, have reinforced their demands for access to technology.” (p. 26-7)

In short, the Western group sees the NAM attempting to use the BWC to inappropriately gain access to technology (which it fears may then be copied or stolen), while the NAM sees the Western group as using non-proliferation concerns and export controls to inappropriately deny access to technology. Widely expressed Western concerns that the global spread of biotechnology is increasing the biological weapons threat probably do little to reduce the concerns of developing nations.

The NAM concerns are understandable, at least in the abstract. In fact, a counterpart of sorts exists in Western nations, where concerns are being expressed that efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons could unduly impede scientific and technological advance. (Whether either set of concerns has a basis in fact is a separate issue, one that has little impact on the political debate.)

This problem is not going to go away. Indeed, the problem is arising outside of the BWC as well. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s proposed global forum on biotechnology is centered precisely on the issue of how “to ensure that biotechnology’s advances are used for the public good and that the benefits are shared equitably around the world” while at the same time managing potential risks. According to Annan, the first goal requires “making technologies available, encouraging transparency and promoting a cooperative environment,” while the second requires “a global framework to mitigate potential risks … a subject crying out for a focused global debate.”

The outcome of the Review Conference now appears to depend, more than anything else, on the ability of diplomats to find a way to accommodate the disagreements in this area. When the EU puts forward a position on Article X that “States Parties should recognize that effective national implementation of the Convention worldwide is essential to fully harness the vast potential of biology for peaceful purposes,” the NAM is likely to balk unless it feels that its concerns are also addressed.

If the NAM does not give up its insistence on an action plan, and the Western Group does not allow any inter-sessional meeting related to Article X to go beyond the issue of disease surveillance, the Review Conference may fail. My guess is that no-one wants that to happen, so some sort of compromise will be found. And in the long run, there is a bigger issue at hand. As South Korea discussed in its paper on universalization (and the same can be said as well for national implementation, for fulfillment of UNSC Resolution 1540 obligations, or for Secretary General Annan’s Forum)

Generally speaking, there are two potential benefits from accession to the BWC membership: security and economic. … The economic benefits emanate from increased cooperation in the peaceful uses of biotechnology.

Some non-Parties may have been hesitant to join the BWC as there are no significant economic benefits relative to the cost of implementation. … More specific programs for the implementation of Article X of the Convention on international cooperation need to be developed.

The EU may be open to finding a solution, as it also stated that

The review of the operation of Article X in subsequent Review Conferences would benefit from more comprehensive information on the implementation of Article X, including needs identified and efforts undertaken by States Parties. States Parties should share this information with other States Parties on a voluntary basis with the Secretariat facilitating this information exchange.

However, the EU has not yet proposed any topics related to Article X that could be said to address core NAM concerns, at least publicly.

To my mind, the best opportunity for a solution is a proposal offered by South Africa, which calls for an inter-sessional meeting on the topic “discussion and examination of the means for improving international cooperation in the use of biotechnology for peaceful purposes.” The generality of the proposal, and the opportunity it would allow for new ideas and approaches to surface, is what makes it useful. The problem is that the Western Group will resist a general approach, while some members of the NAM will want to add a specific reference to “transfer of technology, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, particularly with countries less advanced in this field,” as stated in the NAM paper on Article X.

It’s going to be a long week.

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John Gilbert, a senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and a member of our Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons wants to know the answer to this question.  He writes:

Last week (on November 24, 2006), the U.S. Government tabled a paper at the BWC Review Conference titled “Confronting Noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.” In the paper, the U.S. specifically accuses Iran, Syria, and North Korea of failing to comply with the BWC’s prohibitions. Specifically, the paper says that the U.S. believes Iran “has an offensive biological weapons program”, North Korea “has a biological warfare capability”, and Syria “has conducted research and development for an offensive BW program”. The paper also states the U.S. Government’s belief that North Korea “may have developed, produced, and weaponized for use biological weapons”. Given such a strong denouncement and the aggressive title of the paper, it could appear that the U.S. Government is proposing a new policy of “bio-confrontation”.

However, nowhere in the four pages of text is there a clear explanation of what “confronting noncompliance” is intended to mean or if this really is as clear a policy statement as the title suggests. At various times the paper says that a variety of “confrontational” actions should be taken, including direct discussions, diplomacy, and what is called “attribution response” (which appears to mean “figuring out who conducted a BW attack”). In developing ideas about “attribution response”, the U.S. paper advocates three options – request the UN Secretary General to launch an investigation, engage the World Health Organization (WHO), or deploy a NATO “CBRN defense battalion” to investigate allegations of BW use. In addition, the paper also calls on states to do things individually, such as “terminate their offensive biological weapons programs immediately”, develop their own ways of detecting BWC noncompliance, submit their already-required Confidence Building Measures annual declarations, and work with the WHO, UN Food and Agricultural Organization, and another international organization to strengthen collective public health and agricultural systems.

None of this appears to be new or unique and builds on measures many states (including the U.S.) have been pursuing for years. However, it still is difficult to understand the real significance of this aggressively titled paper. I’m certain that many would appreciate some clarification.

I’d like some clarification too.  And I’d like to know why the U.S. continues to resist engaging in discussions of ways to pursue non-compliance concerns within the BWC, or ways to strengthen the UN Secretary General’s investigation and inspection capabilities so that’s the US recommendations could actually be carried out.  This looks like a lot of smoke, and little fire.

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The Chair of our Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, Dr. Marie Chevrier, traveled to Geneva this week for a lunchtime seminar for BWC Conference delegates on strengthening the BWC by enhancing transparency (advert: we co-sponsored this seminar with the Hamburg Research Group for Biological Arms Control.) She has this to say about the events of Monday and Tuesday:

The second week of the BWC Review Conference seems to be proceeding with little acrimony. As of noon on Tuesday the States Parties had collectively gone through an article by article first reading of the President’s draft Final Declaration. [What this probably means is that the States Parties have agreed in principle on the contents of the Final Declaration, but that a lot of details still need to be worked out - AP] There seems to be no opposition to an inter-sessional process, an “institutional support unit” (ISU) or work plans.

The format of the inter-sessional process is likely to be similar or identical to that of the last three years—meetings of experts followed by meetings of the States Parties. The topics of the inter-sessional meetings have not been decided; a large range of topics is being considered. There is disagreement on whether the inter-sessional meetings will be empowered to take any decisions. Two comments have been heard. One is that the meetings, like those of the last three years, will not take decisions and will issue factual reports only. The other is that the Final Declaration will be silent on whether the meetings can take decisions. This could open the door to decision making, but not specifically empower it.

Article X (peaceful uses of biotechnology) remains controversial. There will be informal meetings today on Article X issues open to States Parties. At the present time the NAM wants more action on Article X, but the EU, USA and the Jackson’s appear to be resisting. It remains to be seen whether the NAM can mount a successful effort to have Article X on the intersessional agenda. It seems unlikely. [For a description of these groupings, see here.]

BWPP reports that the scheduled Tuesday afternoon meeting of the Committee of the Whole was suspended to allow for further consultation on Article X in a separate meeting – another indication of the tension around this issue. Indeed, it has been clear for some time that Article X related issues would be a major source of contention at the Review Conference. As a matter of ensuring equity and ownership, the States Parties need to find a way to include Article X related issues on the inter-sessional agenda lest they end up with an ineffective inter-sessional process, or worse, no inter-sessional process at all.

Marie also reports that

discussions on CBMs seems to be primarily on increasing participation with existing CBMs and facilitating submission to make it easier for States Parties to complete and easier for others to interpret or analyze the submissions. There does not seem to be any discussion of new CBM topics.

Increasing participation in the CBMs is absolutely essential – but at the same time there should also be a thorough examination of their content. The last thing we need is 155 States Parties going through the effort of obtaining, assembling and submitting information that is irrelevant to today’s threats and challenges! Unfortunately, many States Parties are resisting an examination of CBM content – if there is nothing else they can agree on, they can agree on this! It’s time for the U.S. to show some leadership on this issue – but alas all reports are that the U.S. is no more interested than such paragons of transparency as Russia and China.

As for the “ISU”, Marie reports that

while there is support for an ISU, the size of the unit will depend on the mandate given to the unit by the Conference. A three or possibly four person support unit [BWPP says the most likely size is three] seems to be under consideration even before a mandate for the unit is established. A danger could emerge that the size of the unit will be too small to successfully fulfill an ambitious mandate.

The BWPP similarly notes that

compared with implementation support efforts elsewhere [such as the Chemical Weapons Convention], this is an extremely modest provision … Care must be taken not to mandate an implementation support unit with more tasks than could be carried out with the available staff time.

Such care would not be needed if the States Parties weren’t approaching this issue backwards. A serious approach would be for States Parties to decide on the mandate (i.e., what it is that they want to accomplish) first, and then develop the institutional support required. We said as much in our statement to the Review Conference last week – but then, who listens to NGOs?

The BWPP also notes that “although the United States had been the State Party to be convinced about the creation of an implementation support unit, this situation has now been largely resolved and there are now other States Parties, such as Japan, raising concerns about costs.” Round and round we go. States Parties can do better.

It should be understood that our information is based on what those behind the closed doors tell us. But the BWPP reports that

participants in the closed sessions describe what is going on in the meeting room in substantially contradictory ways. It is quite possible that there is no individual who has a clear idea of what the whole Review Conference … looks like. It is also becoming a concern to some delegates that they feel they do not have a full picture of what is going [on].

Indeed, from the initial expressions of concern that the Review Conference was proceeding too smoothly, we are now hearing additional concerns about the process. For instance, the BWPP reports that traditional approaches “appear to be operating too slowly to contend with the pace of the Conference. Once new text is agreed by a group it is sometimes out of date by the time it is available for consideration by all States Parties.” And it reports that there is tension between technical advisors and diplomats arising from the speed of activities within the Review Conference.

It seems clear that the BWC is inventing new ways of operating – at this point we can only wait and see whether they will strengthen the treaty and enhance efforts to counter the threat of biological weapons.

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Between travel back to the United States, and the fact that news is slim now that the States Parties are firmly ensconced behind close doors, there has been less to report about the BWC RevCon in recent days – and family and friends to enjoy.

Still, in Europe they don’t do Thanksgiving (except presumably in the US Embassy), and so the US delegation spent the day in meetings with everyone else. Luckily, the BioWeapons Prevention Project (BWPP), of which we are a member, is issuing daily reports on the activities in Geneva. Last Thursday (Nov. 23) for instance, BWPP reported on the rapid progress being made in the article-by-article review of the Convention, which at first seemed to be virtually completed by the end of the day Wednesday. The potential problem with this, as many were observing, was that it was all seeming a bit too easy. With so much agreement, everyone was wondering if and when the proverbial other shoe would drop. At least through the end of the week, no shoes had been heard.

One reason for the rapidity of the review seems to be that, at least at first, it was largely conducted at a rather surface level. Few proposals for specific language for the Final Declaration of the RevCon were being offered. As BWPP noted after Thursday’s sessions, “the Review Conference is still at the stage of airing issues rather than seeking consensus so many topics have been discussed without bringing them to a conclusion.” That said, Thursday and Friday did see more in depth discussions on two topics: peaceful cooperation (Article X) and assistance to member States if they are “exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention” (Article VII), especially in relation to terrorist attacks .

Moreover, by the end of the week the European Union, the U.S., India and China, and the Non-aligned States (NAM) had all submitted suggested text. India’s proposals were the first submitted by a non-Western nation (except for specific proposals relating to Article X submitted by the NAM) and apparently covered every article of the Convention. The proposals were also notable for including text that incorporated considerations resulting from the 2003-2005 series of annual meetings. This is important for connecting the BWC to the new process inaugurated with the 2003 annual meeting, a process that many States Parties want to see continued and enhanced.

In addition, RevCon President Masood Khan circulated an informal paper on Friday proposing text for a draft Final Declaration in order “to stimulate discussion and focus negotiation,” and the RevCon Secretariat circulated a compilation of all proposed language that had been submitted thus far for the Final Declaration based on the article-by-article review. Hopefully, all of this activity signifies that the States Parties are moving ahead and that the apparent consensus that exists around some issues actually extends below the surface to the actual nuts and bolts operation of the Convention. However, thus far most of the proposals have come from Western nations, so other proposals may yet be in the offing.

In addition to the article-by-article review, the States Parties began discussing so-called “cross-cutting” or “thematic” issues on Thursday, starting with a discussion of how a 2007 - 2010 intersessional process might work. A number of proposals on the form and structure of these meetings are on the table, ranging from a back-to-back one week meetings of Experts and of States Parties, to a two-week meeting of Experts separated by several months from a one-week meeting of States Parties. On Friday, discussions focused on the Confidence Building Measures. It is expected that other cross-cutting issues to be discussed will include the 2003 – 2005 annual meetings (with India having placed specific language on the table, these discussions will hopefully cut to the chase rather quickly), national implementation, universalization, and implementation support. It is on the cross-cutting issues (see our key issues document for more information on these topics) that the States Parties face their most difficult challenges, so it will be interesting to see how the discussions develop.

Of note as well are two other developments. First, President Khan circulated an informal paper on Thursday which collated suggestions that have been made for topics for the inter-sessional meetings. According to the BWPP, the paper “also highlights some practical questions not yet discussed about how a new inter-sessional process should be organized. Examples of these questions include: should one or two topics be covered each year? Should the meetings be able to come to decisions? With four years of meetings, but three groupings of States Parties [historically, these have been the Western Group, Eastern Group, and Non-Aligned Group], how will the allocation of chairs be done equitably? It is likely that the questions in the paper will not be discussed in a single session and will have implications for a number of issues discussed in various sessions.”

Second, Iran has now formally requested that the Convention be amended to prohibit the use of biological weapons, stating that the provisions against use in the 1925 Geneva Protocol are not strong enough. However, other States Parties do not believe that amending the Convention would strengthen the legal situation, especially in light of their affirmation during the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 that the use of biological weapons is “effectively prohibited under Article I of the Convention.” It remains unclear whether and to what extent Iran will be able to carry its request forward.

So, how might week one of the BWC Review Conference best be summed up? The States Parties appear to be making real progress towards issuing a Final Declaration that incorporates the insights garnered from the 2003 – 2005 annual meetings, establishing a new round of inter-sessional meetings for 2007 – 2010, and providing some mechanism for institutional support. The “firm consensus” supporting a new inter-sessional work program, and the focus of discussions on the content of that program, stands in marked contrast to expectations of just a few months ago that significant time would be spent discussing whether there should be a work program at all. Moreover, as BWPP notes, the “role of central arrangements for implementation support also appears to have been the subject of an unexpected early consensus. Barely a few weeks ago there were indications that the creation of any form of central support mechanism would be resisted by a number of States Parties, the most notable of which was the United States. Now it seems there is a growing consensus that a small implementation support unit may be agreed as part of an overall package of measures relating to a new inter-sessional work programme.”

At this point, the outstanding questions revolve around the content of the new work program, how much and what form the institutional support will take, and whether anyof this will significantly advance efforts to counter the threat of biological weapons. These are all very important questions, but the fact that they are being addressed is a significant advance over the situation of five years ago. With effort, the States Parties will also attend to the need to build closer links between the BWC and the plethora of activities occurring outside of the formal BWC context. There is reason for cautious optimism.

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The doors were pulled shut on Tuesday afternoon as the BWC States Parties began their formal article-by-article review of the operation of the Convention. First, however, additional opening statements were presented by several member states. Various intergovernmental organizations made presentations as well.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that “both the urgency and complexity” of achieving the objective of the Convention (see top, this page) “increases each year as our lives and societies are increasingly shaped by what has been called the ‘age of biotechnology.’” The ICRC noted that prevention is now “an essentially multidisciplinary endeavour involving not only delegates to the BWC meetings but also the public health sector, life scientists, industry, law enforcement agencies and the defence and the security community.” It added that “the BWC is the central pillar and authoritative normative basis of multidisciplinary preventive efforts.” Its importance “extends beyond the ‘disarmament’ field. It is the best and only basis for building an effective ‘web of prevention’ which may protect humanity from poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease in the future.” While some may argue with this contention, it is worth considering what the world could look like if the prohibitions of the BWC weren’t there.

The highlight of the open proceedings on Tuesday, at least from this perspective, was the informal session during which 16 non-governmental made statements to the States Parties. As the official UN website for the BWC says: “it has become accepted practice for meetings of the BWC to set aside time during their activities to hear statements from NGOs. This provides an important interface for civil society to speak directly to the representatives of governments from around the world.”

So, what did the NGOs have to say? For one thing, they told the States Parties that finding ways to actively strengthen the BWC, and providing the support necessary for taking action, is critical for successfully countering the threat of biological weapons. For another, they offered their recommendations on steps the States Parties could take.

In what is now a clear theme for the Review Conference, many spoke of the importance of improving national implementation of the obligations nations have under the treaty, including enacting effective legislation and regulatory controls, and “ensuring an appropriate system is put in place for operating and delivering the aims of that legislation” (or as we said - “putting policies, procedures and resources for their enforcement into place”). VERTIC offered specific proposals in this regard and International Network of Scientists and Engineers for Global Responsibility pointed out the importance of ensuring that legislation and controls stay current with developments in science and technology.

National implementation applies to all obligations under the BWC. A number of NGOs, for example, discussed the importance of improving the Confidence Building Measure (CBM) system for information exchange. The CBMs are just one means of increasing transparency, however. The Research Group for Biological Arms Control at Hamburg University offered a very interesting new idea: a trade monitoring system for relevant materials. This idea has the benefit that it is non-discriminatory and thus may have some appeal to nations who complain that they are being denied certain technologies. As the Arms Control Association (ACA) pointed out, “transparency must be increased on the basis of universal rules, so that trust in the compliance of all relevant actors is increased.”

Several NGOs also addressed the important issue of peaceful cooperation, which has often been a divisive one for the States Parties. The Friends World Committee for Consultation pointed out that “action is needed to promote international cooperation for the prevention of disease and other peaceful applications of microbiology.” And the only non-Western NGO, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), stated that “Africa, perhaps more than any other continent, experiences daily the devastating effect of natural and deliberate disease,” particularly in countries with inadequate health care facilities. The ISS called for “peaceful technology transfers and enhancing national health care systems to respond to disease outbreaks,” noting that “efforts to develop cures for, and vaccines to prevent, disease that are endemic to our continent should, in the spirit of Article X, be used to the benefit of all.” The ISS also called for the establishment of a continental or regional pool of vaccines for use in Africa.

In light of the fact that there will likely be a new round of annual meetings from 2007 – 2010, the NGOs proposed a number of topics. Many were similar to topics that have been proposed by some States Parties, but there were also some more interesting, daring, or novel ideas, including:

• That annual meetings should be empowered to address all issues of importance to the Convention, rather than specific topics (ACA) (only in today’s world could such a recommendation be considered daring!).
• Facilitating international cooperation (Bradford University Department of Peace Studies)
• The provision of timely assistance to States Parties upon request in the event they are attacked with biological weapons (Bradford)
• The goals, activities and oversight of national biodefense programs, and strategies to enhance their transparency (Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation/Scientists Working Group)
• Mobilizing and managing a global scientific response to a biological attack (UPMC Center for Biosecurity)
• Investigating allegations of biological weapons use, and of non-compliance with the BWC (several NGOs)

NGOs also promoted some other ideas that no States Party has suggested, including:

• A fresh look at ways to monitor compliance with the convention. (ACA)
• A clear statement that all new types of biological weapons are prohibited, including incapacitating biochemical weapons (ACA)
• Examination of the implications of the convergence of biotechnology, nanotechnology, information technology and cognitive science, and their use for military purposes (Pax Christi International)
• A ban on the creation of new strains of deadly pathogens (Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom)
• Segregation of advanced biodefense research from classified nuclear weapons laboratories (Tri-Valley CARES)

NGOs have ideas to offer and by pushing the boundaries of acceptable action, their work helps strengthen efforts to counter biological weapons. In the future, they should be allowed to make statements during formal plenary sessions, as they are entitled to do in meetings of States Parties to other international Treaties (the Land Mines Treaty, for example). That would surely improve all efforts to counter the threat of biological weapons.

(The complete collection of NGO statements will be posted soon)

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The Sixth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention began today (okay, by now it’s yesterday) in sunny Geneva with the election of Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan as President of the Conference and an opening speech by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. States Parties to the Convention spent the remainder of the first day delivering their opening statements, which revealed that a perhaps surprising degree of common ground already exists among many nations on some key issues. One begins to hope that the States Parties might actually find their way to an agreement to do something significant to strengthen efforts against biological weapons over the next five years. Maybe even multiple somethings. The only real cloud was an exchange of accusations between the US and Iran. Not unexpected, but disappointing nonetheless.

In his speech to the Convention delegates, Secretary General Annan reprised a theme he had first struck up last April in his report “Uniting Against Terrorism” (see paragraphs 52 – 57 after the jump) – that the rise in terrorism and rapid advances in the life sciences and technology since the last Review Conference in 2001 have “transformed the environment in which the Convention operates, and altered ideas about its role and potential.” As a result, he said, we must now see the BWC as being part of an “interlinked array of tools, designed to deal with an interlinked array of problems.” He reiterated his call for the creation of a new global forum that would bring together industry, science, public health, governments and “the public writ large – in an effort to ensure that biotechnology’s advances continue to be used for the benefit of humanity while the risks are managed.”

This is important. It seems likely that some sort of forum is in the offing or else the Secretary General would not have repeated his call. Moreover, in another speech delivered two days ago he began to outline the idea in greater depth, discussing a potential initiative that would focus on two main questions: how to expand the benefits of biotechnology and life science research around the world, and how to develop a “global framework to mitigate potential risks.”

Exactly how this new global forum and the BWC would relate to each other is uncertain, not least because the forum does not yet exist. However, in his speech today the Secretary General stated that the Review Conference could make a “major contribution” to the global forum effort, and he urged the States Parties to bring their various capacities together and to build bridges to other efforts going on outside of the BWC.

The opening statements of the States Parties were about as dry and tedious as could be expected. But within the tedium, it was possible to discern some emerging agreements on several issues. Indeed, as Richard Guthrie reported earlier today for the Biological Weapons Prevention Project, if one examines the working papers that have been submitted by States Parties thus far, “similar problems are identified and similar solutions are proposed. While the papers on similar themes … may have some differences in emphasis, there are not substantive contradictions between them.”

Every State Party that spoke today stressed the need for an active intersessional process. Virtually every State Party stressed the need for active efforts to achieve universality and improve national implementation of the Convention. Most spoke as well of the need to improve the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) system, and of the need to provide institutional support for all of these efforts. Peaceful cooperation in science and technology remains the one area of difference.

The United States has not yet submitted any working papers, and its opening statement suggests that it may go along with only some of these ideas. The U.S. called for the development and endorsement of “action plans” on both national implementation (in this case, national legislation and export controls) and universality, with annual meetings of States Parties to consider progress and follow-up between now and the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. What sort of staff support the U.S. is willing to support remains unclear. Moreover, the U.S. made no mention of CBMs, so its position on this issue also remains unclear.

The United States does support a new round of annual meetings of experts, and proposed several specific topics: disease surveillance, biosecurity (i.e. keeping dual-use equipment and biological materials secure from theft and misuse), enforcement of national legislation, and research oversight, including peer review and publication criteria to prevent research from being misused (this last is not clear from the statement, instead see the press briefing of Undersecretary of State John Rood). Of these, the first two were discussed during the previous round of annual meetings and it is hard to see what significant value would be added by additional discussion. The first topic in particular is already being widely discussed internationally today. The third and especially fourth topics are more ambitious. Since the U.S. apparently continues to oppose allowing any decisions to be made on these topics during the meetings of States Parties, perhaps some other ambitious topics could be considered (such as investigations of use or non-compliance, for example). Hopefully, with a little luck, and a lot of skill, other States Parties will be able to convince the United States to be a bit bolder.

As for the U.S.-Iran mud-fight, the U.S. accused Iran of violating the BWC, and Iran accused the U.S. of single-handedly killing the verification protocol for the BWC in 2001. Both may be right, and the U.S. allegation in particular is quite serious (a topic for another day), but throwing around accusations that you won’t (U.S.), or can’t (Iran) do anything about (except stop up the negotiations) does not a make for a good start. Unfortunately, it will probably dominate the headlines tomorrow. Let’s hope they get over it and move on.

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