1. Taking Effective Action: A New Work Program

The Annual Meetings held from 2003 to 2005 established a new process for the BWC - one based on frequent, ongoing, in-depth and focused discussion of specific topics and problems and on the inclusion of a much broader array of participants than had traditionally occurred. Widespread interest now exists in continuing the new process over the next five years, and in broadening its purpose from promoting information sharing and discussion to more actively facilitating and coordinating national and international action. Properly conceived, a new work program could further connect the BWC process with and help integrate the plethora of efforts to counter biological weapons which are taking place outside the BWC but which suffer from a lack of coordination.

Achieving these goals will be difficult. The United States will support a new set of meetings as long as they are “focused, constructive, and do real work.” Thus, negotiations will center on the form, purpose and content of the new work program. A number of proposals have been offered and debates are likely to focus on the following questions: will the work program be organized around a series of meetings on non-recurring topics, around a few topics that will be discussed each year, or around some combination of these two modalities; will the work program be designed solely for the purpose of information exchange, or will it also support real and coordinated work to address today’s needs and challenges; if the latter, will goals, strategies and benchmarks be set for some elements of the work plan; will the meetings continue to build connections with and help integrate other ongoing efforts occurring outside of the BWC; how much power will the States Parties have during the meetings to make decisions and agree on further action; and will adequate support for the work program be established?

The most intense negotiations will likely occur over the specific topics for the work program: will they be limited to a constrained set of issues where significant agreement already exists (such as national implementation and universality); will a somewhat broader range of more difficult topics be included (such as Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), and peaceful scientific cooperation and technical exchange); or will some Annual Meetings begin to address some of the most difficult challenges to biological weapons control and the norm against biological weapons, including investigations of non-compliance and biological weapons use, advances in and the spread of science and technology, the growth of more robust and secretive biodefense activities, and incapacitating biochemical weapons. The U.S. has already ruled out any discussion of investigations, and seems unlikely to entertain discussions of most of the other difficult issues. Finally, success in crafting a new round of Annual Meetings will also likely depend on the ability of States Parties to overcome divisions and find a workable balance between the proliferation concerns of developed nations and the goals of developing nations in enhancing peaceful cooperation and technical exchange so that all will be invested in the work program and all will strive to maximize its outcomes.

1. Taking Effective Action: A New Work Program

2. Enabling Effective Action: A Stronger Support Mechanism

3. Fulfilling Obligations: National Implementation

4. Enhancing Transparency: Information Exchange and Confidence Building Measures

5. Resolving tensions: The relationship between non-proliferation and peaceful cooperation

6. Addressing Advances in Science and Technology

7. Achieving Universality


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