Rapid advances in and the global spread of the life sciences and biotechnology hold great promise for health and economic development around the world. They also make biological weapons capabilities more widely accessible and their development and production easier, cheaper, and more difficult to detect and prevent. New types of weapons and militarily attractive capabilities are becoming possible. And as the life sciences become increasingly multi-disciplinary, the biological weapons problem is becoming more complex. In short, advances in science and technology continue to challenge both the norm against biological weapons and efforts to prevent their development and use.

These concerns have led some non-governmental experts and some governments to recommend the creation of a science advisory body for the BWC. Such a body could regularly assess and provide advice on the implications of scientific and technological developments for biological weapons control efforts and the BWC. More ambitiously, it could help resolve the tension between the need for members to effectively demonstrate compliance with the norm and the prohibitions of the BWC and their need to maintain legitimate secrecy of some biodefense activities, and address the difficult issue of governance of the life sciences and biotechnology.

However, in the absence of a more robust and institutionalized Convention, or of a demonstrated willingness by its members to deal with the difficult issues surrounding science and technology,it is unclear whether such a body would add significant value to the Convention. At any rate, the U.S. has consistently opposed its establishment. Instead, current proposals are that advances in science and technology be a topic for a future Annual Meeting, or preferably, that it be on the agenda of every Annual Meeting. Whether this proposal will be acceptable to the United States remains uncertain, especially since any useful discussion of this issue would need to go beyond routine reviews of advances in science and technology, and reaffirmations that BWC prohibitions cover those advances. That can be accomplished at Review Conferences. The justification for annual consideration of advances in science and technology is that it will enable members to focus, in a way that is not feasible during a Review Conference, on giving practical meaning to the norm against biological weapons by addressing the real challenges posed by such advances and exploring new ways for effectively minimizing proliferation and compliance concerns while not unduly impeding the use of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

1. Taking Effective Action: A New Work Program

2. Enabling Effective Action: A Stronger Support Mechanism

3. Fulfilling Obligations: National Implementation

4. Enhancing Transparency: Information Exchange and Confidence Building Measures

5. Resolving tensions: The relationship between non-proliferation and peaceful cooperation

6. Addressing Scientific and Technological Advance

7. Achieving Universality