Statement of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

and the Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons

 to the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

November 21, 2006

Mr. President, Excellencies, Distinguished Representatives, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons and the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation,appreciate this opportunity to address you at the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Establishing a new and active intercessional work program for the next five years is of the utmost importance for building on the accomplishments of the past four years and strengthening efforts to prevent the development and use of biological weapons by any actor, anywhere in the world.  We are hopeful that widespread support among States Parties for a new work program will lead to a positive outcome to the Review Conference.  However, we attach great importance to avoiding lowest common denominator approaches that fail to significantly address the difficult problems facing efforts to counter biological weapons.  The work program for the next intercessional period can be both pragmatic and bold.

A serious effort to improve the status of national implementation of the BWC is long overdue.  However, the enactment of national legislation and regulatory controls does not go far enough.  Legislation and controls must be given meaning and effect by putting policies, procedures and resources for their enforcement into place.  Equally important is harmonization of national legislation and controls so that there are no weak links in the chain securing the world against biological weapons.

Moreover, national implementation of the BWC applies to more than legislation and regulatory controls – it applies to all obligations under the Convention.  In this regard, we highlight the central importance of improving participation in the Confidence Building information exchange.  All BWC States Parties should fully participate every year. With continued advances in science and technology, the growth of more robust and secretive biodefense research and development programs, and the absence of a legally binding compliance mechanism, the importance of demonstrating compliance with the prohibitions of the BWC has only grown in recent years.  Thus, we urge you to develop a serious and ambitious work program for improving participation in the CBM process.

Improving the state of national implementation requires coordinated action and the provision of a basic level of regular staff support.  States Parties should not let concerns about a support structure limit the steps they agree to take.  Instead, we recommend that States Parties should, at this Conference, agree on the goals and strategies required to make substantive progress in this area, and then augment the support mechanism as needed to meet those goals and undertake those strategies.  In this way a flexible support mechanism(s) could expand and contract as needed.

If the BWC is to have continued currency and relevance in today’s world, States Parties need to address some of the hard issues that have been avoided.  Serious and continuing concerns about non-compliance and growing concerns about robust and secretive biodefense programs are too large to be solved through a process of revising CBMs alone.  It is time for the States Parties to follow up on the 2004 intercessional meetings and determine how allegations of biological weapons use or non-compliance with the BWC can be investigated. This is not about verification.  It is about responding to violations of the Convention.  Doing little other than naming names is neither useful nor productive.  Because of sensitivities surrounding this issue, the best way forward might be to dedicate a portion of one annual meeting to this topic, with the understanding that decisions could not be taken until the Seventh Review Conference.  In addition, we urge States Parties to devote a portion of one annual meeting to the exchange of information about the goals, activities and oversight of national biodefense activities and ideas on strategies to enhance transparency.

Finally, as the Secretary General and many others have noted, efforts to counter the threat of biological weapons have proliferated outside of the BWC process in recent years.  We welcome these efforts which can often be undertaken quickly and efficiently.  However, these activities lack integration. The article-by-article review of the Convention provides an opportunity for States Parties to systematically analyze how activities within the BWC regime interact with governance efforts outside of the BWC context, and determine how the BWC process could complement and contribute to such efforts. The next intercessional process could then reposition the BWC as a central and much needed global instrument for integrating and strengthening efforts to prevent the development and use of biological weapons.  Such an annual intercessional process, through which States Parties, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations could collectively subject the full range of ongoing activities to regular scrutiny and focus on building and advancing integrated efforts to counter the biological weapons threat, would be a truly significant advance.

Thank you for your attention.