

Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention
on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on their Destruction

Final Document

PART II

Final Declaration

II. FINAL DECLARATION

THE STATES PARTY TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILING OF BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) AND TOXIN WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, HAVING MET IN GENEVA FROM 9 TO 27 SEPTEMBER 1991 TO REVIEW THE OPERATION OF THE CONVENTION, SOLEMNLY DECLARE:

- Their conviction that the Convention is essential to international peace and security;
- Their reaffirmation of their determination to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and their conviction that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;
- Their continued determination, for the sake of mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons, and their conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind;
- Their reaffirmation of their firm commitment to the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, and of their belief that universal adherence to the Convention, and of their belief that universal adherence to the Convention would enhance international peace and security;
- Their determination to enhance the implementation and effectiveness of the Convention and to further strengthen its authority, including through the confidence-building measures and organizational arrangements set out below;
- Their recognition that effective verification could reinforce the Convention;
- Their conviction that the full implementation of the provisions of the Convention should not hamper economic and technological development and international cooperation in the field of peaceful biological activities.

The State parties recognize that the important principles contained in this Solemn Declaration can also serve as a basis for further strengthening of the Convention.

PREAMBLE

The Conference reaffirms the importance of the elements in the review of the Preamble to the Convention contained in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.

ARTICLE I

The Conference notes the importance of Article I as the Article which defines the scope of the Convention and reaffirms its support for the provisions of this Article.

The Conference reaffirms that the Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, other acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins harmful to plants and animals, as well as humans, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.

The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific and technological developments, *inter alia*, in the fields of microbiology, genetic engineering and biotechnology, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with the objectives and provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking given by the States parties in Article I applies to all such developments. The Conference also reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally covers all microbial agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, whatever their origin or method of production.

The Conference notes that experimentation involving open-air release of pathogens or toxins harmful to man, animals or plants that has no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes is inconsistent with the undertakings contained in Article I.

The Conference stresses that States parties should take all necessary safety precautions to protect populations and the environment in relation to activities not prohibited by the Convention.

The Conference emphasizes the vital importance of full implementation by all States parties of all provisions of the Convention and expresses concern at statements by some States parties that compliance with Articles I, II and III has been, in their view, subject to grave doubt in certain cases and that efforts since the Second Review Conference to resolve these problems have not been successful. The Conference agrees that the application by States parties of a positive approach in questions of compliance in accordance with the provisions of the Convention is in the interest of all States parties and that continued non-compliance with its provisions could undermine confidence in the Convention.

On the basis of the principle that sciences should support quality of life, the Conference appeals through the States parties to their scientific communities to continue to support only activities that have justification under the biological and toxin weapons Convention for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, and refrain from activities which are in breach of obligations deriving from provisions of the Convention.

ARTICLE II

The Conference notes the importance of Article II and welcomes the statements made by States which have become parties to the Convention since the Second Review Conference that they do not possess agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery referred to in Article I of the Convention. The Conference believes that such statements contribute to enhancing confidence in the

Convention.

The Conference stresses that States which become Parties to the Convention, in implementing the provisions of this Article, shall observe all necessary safety precautions to protect populations and the environment.

ARTICLE III

The Conference notes the importance of Article III and welcomes the statements which States that have acceded to the Convention have made to the effect that they have not transferred agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery, specified in Article I of the Convention, to any recipient whatsoever and have not furnished assistance, encouragement or inducement to any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire them. The Conference affirms that Article III is sufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national or sub-national levels. The Conference notes that a number of States parties have already taken concrete measures to give effect to their undertakings under this Article, and calls for appropriate measures by all States parties. Transfers relevant to the Convention should be authorized only when the intended use is for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. The implementation of this Article with respect to such transfers should continue to be the subject of multilateral consideration.

The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article should not be used to impose restrictions and/or limitations on the transfer for purposes consistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention of scientific knowledge, technology, equipment and materials to States Parties.

ARTICLE IV

The Conference notes the importance of Article IV, under which each State party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit or prevent any acts or actions which would contravene the Convention.

The Conference notes those measures already taken by some States parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, and reiterates its call to any State party that has not yet taken any necessary measures to do so immediately, in accordance with its constitutional processes. Such measures should apply within the territory of a State party, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The Conference invites each State party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with international law, the application of such measures to actions taken anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality.

The Conference notes the importance of:

- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed effectively to enhance domestic compliance with the Convention;
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent

unauthorized access to and removal of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins;

- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military educational programmes of information dealing with the prohibition of microbial or other biological agents or toxins and the provisions of the Geneva Protocol.

The Conference believes that such measures which States parties might undertake in accordance with their constitutional processes would strengthen the effectiveness of the Convention.

The Conference notes that some States parties, as requested by the Second Review Conference, have provided to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs information on and texts of specific legislation enacted or other measures taken to assure domestic compliance with the Convention. The Conference invites these States parties, and encourages all States parties, to provide such information and texts in the future. In this regard the Conference welcomes agreement by the States parties participating in the Third Review Conference to implement a new confidence-building measure entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures". In addition, the Conference invites all States parties to provide any useful information on the implementation of such measures.

The Conference welcomes regional measures such as the Mendoza Declaration as well as other initiatives dealing with the renunciation of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, as concrete positive steps towards the strengthening of the biological and toxin weapons Convention regime.

ARTICLE V

In accordance with the decision of the Second Review Conference, and taking into account views expressed concerning the need to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Article V, the Conference reviewed the effectiveness of the provisions in Article V for consultation and cooperation and of the cooperative measures agreed in the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference, and considered whether or not further actions were called for to create further cooperative measures. The Conference came to the following conclusions and recommendations:

The Conference notes the importance of the confidence-building measures agreed upon at the Second Review Conference, as well as the modalities elaborated by the Ad Hoc Meeting of the Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention held in 1987. The Conference recognizes the exchange of information that took place on this agreed basis between 1987 and 1991. The Conference urges all States parties to submit information to future rounds of information exchange.

With a view to promoting increased participation and strengthening further the exchange of information, the Conference agrees to reaffirm those measures established at the Second Review Conference with the following improvements: to add a declaration on "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare"; to amend and extend the exchange of data on research centres and laboratories; to amend the exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; to amend the measure for the active promotion of contacts; and to add three new confidence-building measures entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures"; "Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research development programmes"; and "Declaration of vaccine

production facilities".

Accordingly, the Conference, mindful of the provisions of Article V and Article X, and determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to enhance confidence in the implementation of its provisions, agrees that the States parties are to implement, on the basis of mutual cooperation, the following measures set out in the annex to this Final Declaration, in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities:

1. Declaration form on "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to declare"
2. Confidence-building measure "A":
 - Part 1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories;
 - Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defence research and development programmes.
3. Confidence-building measure "B":
 - Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins.
4. Confidence-building measure "C":
 - Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge.
5. Confidence-building measure "D":
 - Active promotion of contacts.
6. Confidence-building measure "E":
 - Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures.
7. Confidence-building measure "F":
 - Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes.
8. Confidence-building measure "G":
 - Declaration of vaccine production facilities.

The Conference also agrees that the exchange of information and data, using the revised forms, be sent to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs no later than 15 April on an annual

basis and should cover the previous calendar year.

The Conference recognizes that the new and the revised procedures which the States parties have agreed to implement will add further duties to, and will make even greater demands on the time of, the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. The Conference therefore requests the United Nations Secretary-General to allocate the necessary staff resources and other requirements based in the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva to assist the effective implementation of the relevant decisions of the Third Review Conference, in particular of the confidence-building measures. In that respect the Secretary-General is requested to receive, compile, and make available to States parties information related to the implementation of the Convention and of the decisions of the Third Review Conference. The use of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs computer database system could facilitate this work. The States parties agree to review *inter alia* the requirement for, and the operation of, these additional arrangements at the Fourth Review Conference.

The Conference notes the importance of Article V and reaffirms the obligation assumed by States parties to consult and cooperate with one another in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention.

The Conference reaffirms the agreement reached at the Second Review Conference, and agrees that in order to strengthen the implementation of the provisions of Article V the following provisions should be adopted:

- A formal consultative meeting could be preceded by bilateral or other consultations by agreement among those States parties involved in the problems which had arisen;
- Requests for the convening of a consultative meeting shall be addressed to the Depositaries, who shall immediately inform all States parties of the request and shall convene within 30 days an informal meeting of the interested States parties to discuss the arrangements for the formal consultative meeting, which shall be convened within 60 days of receipt of the request;
- With regard to the taking of decisions, the consultative meeting shall proceed in accordance with rule 28 of the rules of procedure of the Review Conference;
- The costs of the consultative meeting shall be met by the States parties participating in accordance with the United Nations assessment scale prorated to take into account differences between the United Nations membership and the number of States parties participating in the meeting;
- A consultative meeting may consider any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention, suggest ways and means for further clarifying, *inter alia*, with assistance of technical experts, any matter considered ambiguous or unresolved, as well as initiate appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter;
- The consultative meeting, or any State party, may request specialized assistance in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions

of, the Convention, through, *inter alia*, appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter;

- The States parties agree that, should the consultative meeting, or any State party, make use of such procedures within the framework of the United Nations, including lodging a complaint with the Security Council under Article VI of the Convention, the Secretary-General may be kept informed;

- The Conference considers that States parties shall cooperate with the consultative meeting in its consideration of any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention, and in clarifying ambiguous and unresolved matters, as well as cooperate in appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Conference reaffirms that consultation and cooperation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

The Conference, determined to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the Convention and recognizing that effective verification could reinforce the Convention, decides to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States parties to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint.

The Group shall meet in Geneva for the period 30 March to 10 April 1992. The Group will hold additional meetings as appropriate to complete its work as soon as possible, preferably before the end of 1993. In accordance with the agreement reached in the Preparatory Committee, the Group shall be chaired by Ambassador Tibor Tóth (Hungary), who shall be assisted by two Vice-Chairmen to be elected by the States Parties participating in the first meeting.

The Group shall seek to identify measures which could determine:

- Whether a State party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or peaceful purposes;
- Whether a State party is developing, producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Such measures could be addressed singly or in combination. Specifically, the Group shall seek to evaluate potential verification measures, taking into account the broad range of types and quantities of microbial and other biological agents and toxins, whether naturally occurring or altered, which are capable of being used as means of warfare.

To these ends the Group could examine potential verification measures in terms of the following main criteria:

- Their strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and quality of information they provide, and fail to provide;
- Their ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities;
- Their ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance;
- Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements;
- Their financial, legal, safety and other organizational implications;
- Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development and other permitted activities, and their implication for the confidentiality of commercial proprietary information.

In examining potential verification measures, the Group should take into account data and other information relevant to the Convention provided by the States parties.

The Group shall adopt by consensus a report taking into account views expressed in the course of its work. The report of the Group shall be a description of its work on the identification and examination of potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint, according to this mandate.

The report of the Group shall be circulated to all States Parties for their consideration. If a majority of States Parties ask for the convening of a conference to examine the report, by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, such a conference will be convened. In such a case the conference shall decide on any further action. The conference shall be preceded by a preparatory committee.

The Conference stresses the need for all States to deal seriously with compliance issues and emphasizes that failure to do so undermines the Convention and the arms control and disarmament process in general.

The Conference appeals to States Parties to make all possible efforts to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention with a view towards encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to. In this connection, the States Parties agree to provide a specific, timely response to any compliance concern alleging a breach of their obligations under the Convention. Such responses should be submitted through the procedures provided for under the Convention. The Conference further requests that information on such efforts be provided to the Fourth Review Conference.

The Conference welcomes the proposals set out in annex I of United Nations document A/44/561 developed by a group of qualified experts and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1990 in its resolution 45/57 for technical guidelines and procedures to guide the United Nations Secretary-General in the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of chemical and

bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons. The Conference recalls, in this context, United Nations Security Council resolution 620 of 1988, which encouraged the United Nations Secretary-General to carry out prompt investigations, in response to allegations brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons. The States Parties agree to consult, at the request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threat of use of bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the United Nations Secretary-General in carrying out such investigations. The Conference stresses that in the case of alleged use the United Nation is called upon to take appropriate measures, which could include a request to the Security Council to consider action in accordance with the Charter.

Taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, neighbouring States or States belonging to the same region may also adopt measures that are consistent with the aims and objectives of the Convention in order to facilitate or complement the implementation of the decisions of the Third Review Conference with respect to Article V.

ARTICLE VI

The Conference notes that the provisions of this Article have not been invoked.

The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VI, which, in addition to the procedures contained in Article V, provides that any State Party which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of its obligations under the Convention may lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council. The Conference emphasized the provision of Article VI that such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity. It stressed that, as in the case of the implementation of all the provisions and procedures set forth in the Convention, the procedures foreseen in Article VI should be implemented in good faith and within the scope of the Convention.

The Conference invites the Security Council to consider immediately any complaint lodged under Article VI and to initiate any measures it considers necessary for the investigation of the complaint. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of each State Party to cooperate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may initiate.

The Conference recalls, in this context, United Nations Security Council resolution 620 of 1988, which encouraged the United Nations Secretary-General to carry out prompt investigations, in response to allegations brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons.

The Conference invites the Security Council to inform each State Party of the results of any investigation initiated under Article VI and to consider promptly any appropriate further action which may be necessary.

ARTICLE VII

The Conference notes with satisfaction that these provisions have not been invoked.

The Conference reaffirms the undertaking made by each State Party to provide or support assistance in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

The Conference takes note of desires expressed that, should a request for assistance be made, it be promptly considered and an appropriate response provided. In this context, pending consideration of a decision by the Security Council, timely emergency assistance could be provided by States Parties if requested.

The Conference considers that in the event that this article might be invoked, the United Nations, with the help of appropriate intergovernmental organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), could play a coordinating role.

ARTICLE VIII

The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VIII and stresses the importance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

The Conference reaffirms that nothing contained in the Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. The Conference appeals to all States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to fulfil their obligations assumed under that Protocol and urges all States not yet Parties to the said Protocol to accede to it without delay.

The Conference acknowledges that the 1925 Geneva Protocol, by prohibiting the use of bacteriological methods of warfare, forms an essential complement to the biological and toxin weapons Convention.

The Conference stresses the importance of the withdrawal of all reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol related to the biological and toxin weapons Convention.

The Conference notes that the United Nations has taken significant action in support of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 during the period under review, including through Security Council resolution 620 (1988) and General Assembly resolutions 41/58 C, 42/37 C, 43/74 A, 44/115 B and 45/57 C.

The Conference recalls that the participating States at the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris from 7 to 11 January 1989, solemnly reaffirmed in its Final Declaration the prohibition as established in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and urged all States which had not done so to accede to it.

ARTICLE IX

The Conference reaffirms the obligation assumed by States Parties to continue negotiations in good faith towards an early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

All States Parties participating in the Conference reiterate their strong commitment to this important goal.

The Conference notes with satisfaction the substantial progress made in the negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons in the Conference on Disarmament during the period in review. The Conference also takes note of the bilateral agreement, signed in June 1990, between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons.

The Conference urges the Conference on Disarmament to exert all possible efforts to implement the mandate for the chemical weapons negotiations as amended on 20 June 1991, and to achieve final agreement by 1992 on the convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Conference notes the statements of intent by many States to become original parties to the chemical weapons convention and calls on all States to adhere early to the convention when concluded so as to ensure its early entry into force.

ARTICLE X

The Conference emphasizes the increasing importance of the provisions of Article X, especially in the light of recent scientific and technological developments in the field of biotechnology, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins with peaceful applications, which have vastly increased the potential for cooperation between States to help promote economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress, particularly in the developing countries, in conformity with their interests, needs and priorities.

The Conference, while acknowledging what has already been done towards this end, notes with concern the increasing gap between the developed and the developing countries in the field of biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and other related areas. The Conference urges all States Parties actively to promote international cooperation and exchange with States Parties in the peaceful uses of biotechnology, and urges the developed countries possessing advanced biotechnology to adopt positive measures to promote technology transfer and international cooperation on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in particular with the developing countries, for the benefit of all mankind.

The Conference urges the United Nations and States Parties take specific measures within their competence for the promotion of the fullest possible international cooperation in this field through their active intervention. Such measures could include, *inter alia*:

- Transfer and exchange of information concerning research programmes in bio-sciences, and greater cooperation in international public health and disease control;
- Wider transfer and exchange of information, materials and equipment among States on a systematic and long-term basis;
- Active promotion of contacts between scientists and technical personnel on a reciprocal basis, in relevant fields;

- Increased technical cooperation and assistance, including training programmes to developing countries in the use of bio-sciences and genetic engineering for peaceful purposes through active association with United Nations institutions, including the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology;
- Facilitating the conclusion of bilateral, regional and multiregional agreements providing, on a mutually advantageous, equal and non-discriminatory basis, for their participation in the development and application of biotechnology;
- Encouraging the coordination of national and regional programmes and working out in an appropriate manner the ways and means of cooperation in this field;
- Cooperation in providing information on their national epidemiological surveillance and data reporting systems, and in providing assistance, on a bilateral level and/or in conjunction with WHO, regarding epidemiological surveillance, with a view to improvements in the identification and timely reporting of significant outbreaks of human and animal diseases.

The Conference considers that the establishment of a world data bank under the supervision of the United Nations might be a suitable way of facilitating the flow of information in the field of genetic engineering, biotechnology and other scientific developments.

The Conference urges the use of existing institutional means within the United Nations system and the full utilization of the possibilities provided by specialized agencies and other international organizations.

The Conference notes that existing institutional ways and means of ensuring multilateral cooperation between the developed and developing countries would need to be developed further in order to promote international cooperation in the field of peaceful activities in such areas as medicine, public health and agriculture.

The Conference calls upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to propose for inclusion on the agenda of a relevant United Nations body, not later than 1993, a discussion and examination of the means for improving institutional mechanisms in order to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information regarding the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

The Conference recommends that invitations to participate in this discussion and examination should be extended to all States Parties, whether or not they are members of the United Nations and concerned specialized agencies.

The Conference requests the States Parties and the United Nations Secretariat to include in the document materials prepared for the above-mentioned discussion of States Parties, information and suggestions on the implementation of Article X, taking into account the preceding paragraphs. Furthermore, it urges the specialized agencies, *inter alia*, FAO, WHO, UNESCO, WIPO and UNIDO, to participate in this discussion and fully cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and requests the Secretary-General to send all relevant information of this Conference to these agencies.

The Conference requests that the Secretary-General collate on an annual basis, and for the information of States Parties, reports on how this Article is being implemented.

The Conference notes that one of the fields of cooperation in microbiology would be the study of the influence of enhanced radioactivity on microorganisms aimed at reducing its potentially harmful effects on humans, plants and animals, to be carried out within the United Nations programme for the minimization of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

The Conference welcomes efforts to elaborate an international programme of vaccine development for the prevention of diseases which would involve scientific and technical personnel from developing countries which are States Parties to the Convention. The Conference recognizes that such a programme might not only enhance peaceful international cooperation in biotechnology but will also contribute to improving health care in developing countries and provide transparency in accordance with the Convention.

ARTICLE XI

The Conference notes the importance of the provisions of Article XI and that since the entry into force of the Convention the provisions of the Article have not been invoked. In this context the Conference underlined that the provisions of Article XI should in principle be implemented in such a way as not to affect the universality of the Convention.

ARTICLE XII

The Conference decides that a Fourth Review Conference shall be held in Geneva at the request of a majority of States Parties not later than 1996.

The Conference decides that the Third Review Conference shall consider, *inter alia*:

- The impact of scientific and technological developments relating to the Convention;
- The relevance of the provisions of the chemical weapons convention on the effective implementation of the biological and toxin weapons Convention;
- The effectiveness of coordinated confidence-building measures as agreed in this Final Declaration;
- The report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on Verification, as well as the conclusions of a special conference, if it is convened earlier;
- The requirement for, and the operation of, the requested allocation by the United Nations Secretary-General of staff resources and other requirements to assist the effective implementation of the relevant decisions of the Third Review Conference, and in particular of the confidence-building measures;

- In the light of these considerations and of the provisions of Article XI, whether or not follow-up action is called for to create further cooperative measures in the context of Article V or legally binding improvements to the Convention, or a combination of both.

ARTICLE XIII

The Conference notes the provisions of Article XIII and expresses its satisfaction that no State Party to the Convention has exercised its right to withdraw from the Convention.

ARTICLE XIV

The Conference notes with satisfaction that a significant number of States have ratified or acceded to the Convention since the Second Review Conference and the 1989 Paris Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, and that there are now more than 115 States Parties to the Convention, including all the permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Conference calls upon States which have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which have not signed the Convention to join the States Parties thereto thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.

In this connection the Conference encourages States Parties to take action to persuade non-parties to accede to the Convention without delay.

The Conference particularly welcomes regional initiatives that would lead to wider accession to the Convention.

The Third Review Conference appeals to those States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons which have not taken part in the Conference to participate in the implementation of provisions contained in the Final Declaration of this Conference, and in particular to implement the agreed confidence-building measures.

ARTICLE XV

The Conference notes the provisions of Article XV.