

Achieving the outcomes of the Sixth Review Conference

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In the run-up to the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), to be held in November–December 2006, a number of issues appear to be attracting wide support among the states parties.¹ These include achieving universal adherence to the convention; improving national implementation of the convention by all states parties; enhancing both the quality of and participation in the annual confidence-building measure returns; strengthening the United Nations Secretary-General's mechanisms for investigating the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons; and finally a further programme of annual meetings of states parties during the intersessional period leading to the anticipated Seventh Review Conference in 2011.

However, agreement on such issues in the Final Declaration, difficult enough in itself, is but the first step. This article examines how these possible outcomes of the Review Conference could be implemented effectively and efficiently to yield concrete results.

Universal adherence

At successive review conferences the states parties have called upon states that have not yet ratified or acceded to the convention to do so without delay.² Similar exhortations were also made in resolution 60/96, adopted by the General Assembly without a vote on 8 December 2005.³ There is clearly widespread and persistent recognition by all states parties of the importance of achieving universal adherence. However, the rate at which states have become party to the convention has been very slow during recent years, as shown in Table 1.

This slow rate is all the more pronounced when a comparison is made with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered into force on 29 April 1997.⁴ At the First Review Conference of the CWC in April–May 2003, states parties recommended the development and implementation of “a plan of action to further encourage, in a systematic and coordinated manner, adherence to the Convention and to assist States ready to join the Convention in their national preparations to implement it”.⁵ The action plan was duly adopted by the Executive Council on 24 October 2003.⁶ Table 2 shows the success of the CWC's sustained efforts to universalize adherence to the convention.

In March 2006, the number of states party to the CWC totalled 178, over 20 more than the number of states party to the BTWC. The forthcoming Sixth Review Conference therefore has an

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Table 1. Participation in the BTWC, 2001–2005

Date	Number of states parties	Number of signatory states
October 2001	144	18
October 2002	146	17
November 2003	151	16
December 2004	153	16
June 2005	155	16

Sources: List of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, UN documents BWC/CONFV/INF.1, 26 October 2001; BWC/CONFV/INF.4, 25 October 2002; BWC/MSP/2003/INF.2, 14 November 2003; BWC/MSP/2004/INF.2, 3 December 2004; and BWC/MSP/2005/MX/INF.5, 21 June 2005.

Table 2. Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention, 1997–2006

Date	Number of states parties	Number of states parties for which entry into force was pending	Signatory states not party	Non-signatory states not party
April 1997	87	0	78	28
April 1998	107	1	60	25
April 1999	121	0	48	24
April 2000	132	3	37	21
April 2001	143	0	31	19
April 2002	143	0	31	19
May 2003	151	2	25	16
October 2003	154	3	22	15
June 2004	164	0	18	12
February 2005	167	0	16	11
March 2006	178	0	8	8

Sources: Data for 1997–2002: OPCW Technical Secretariat, *Background Paper on Universal Adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention*, document RC-1/S/5, 25 April 2003; data for 2002–2005: Scott Spence, 2005, *Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC Experience*, Review Conference Paper no. 13, University of Bradford; data for 2006: Graham S. Pearson and Nicholas A. Sims, 2006, *Successful Outcomes for the Sixth Review Conference*, Review Conference Paper no. 16, University of Bradford.

opportunity to mount an initiative to encourage all those states that have acceded to the CWC to also accede to the BTWC. Rather than just adopting an exhortation, the conference should actually agree to do something. This might be called an action plan, but there may be advantage in adopting different terminology, with a view to reaching 180 states parties no later than the Seventh Review Conference. The Review Conference must also agree on *how* action is to be taken and how progress is to be reported to states parties. A progress report on universality would be an appropriate agenda item for future annual meetings of states parties; these meetings could also make decisions on further action, should it be necessary.

States not party to the BTWC that are yet party to the CWC must be approached and provided with assistance to enable accession. These tasks could be carried out by a small interim secretariat, or by agreement that the Bureau of the Sixth Review Conference and its support staff should do this during the intersessional period. Or, along the lines of measures adopted by CTBT states at their meetings on the entry into force of the CTBT, the Sixth Review Conference could agree to appoint a Coordinating State and Regional Coordinators tasked with raising the profile of the BTWC, particularly

within regional organizations. Since 2003, CTBT signatory states have also agreed to designate a Special Representative, whose job it is to “provide States Signatories and non-signatories with information on the significance of the Treaty in the wider context of nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation”.⁷ These activities have meant that despite the CTBT not having entered into force (largely because of the requirement that certain states must ratify it before it can enter into force), the treaty has gained 135 ratifications since 1996—only 20 fewer than the BTWC—and states are still ratifying (9 in 2006 so far). Whatever institutional mechanism states parties decide upon, it has been demonstrated by the CWC and the CTBT that achieving universality requires a means by which coherent, sustained, high-level pressure can be brought to bear on states not party over a long time frame.

Note should also be taken of the European Union’s Joint Action in support of the BTWC, which provides almost EUR 510,000 for “the promotion of the universality” of the convention.⁸ This is to be achieved through carrying out “regional and sub-regional workshops and seminars” during 2006 and 2007. Preparatory meetings have already been held and the first regional seminar took place in Nairobi on 21–22 June. Four further seminars are planned. Following the precedent set by the EU’s support for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (a first Joint Action in 2004 and a second in 2005), it is likely that the EU will renew the BTWC Joint Action when the current one expires. A group of like-minded BTWC states parties could conceivably adopt a similar approach to providing the resources necessary to promote universality.

Achieving universality requires a means by which coherent, sustained, high-level pressure can be brought to bear on states.

Improving national implementation

At successive review conferences the BTWC states parties have reaffirmed their commitment to take any necessary measures “to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere” (Article IV).⁹ However, the extent to which states parties have actually enacted such measures is far from complete.¹⁰

The CWC has a similar requirement and compliance had been equally patchy, so the states parties agreed at the CWC’s First Review Conference to develop, “a plan of action ... with the objective of fostering the full and effective implementation of the Convention by all States Parties”.¹¹ This action plan was agreed at the Conference of States Parties in 2003.¹²

Table 3 shows the results of the efforts by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its member states: even since the action plan, and although almost two-thirds of states parties to the CWC had submitted information on their national implementation to the OPCW, only about one-third had adopted legislation that covered the areas key to the enforcement of the CWC by 2005. In light of this, the Tenth Session of the CWC Conference of the States Parties adopted a decision to follow up the action plan.¹³ The decision focuses on those states parties that lack the very basics of national implementation—a National Authority and implementing legislation. The decision gives such states parties a limited time in which to redress such deficiencies and, if remedial action is not forthcoming, the Executive Council can invoke the compliance assurance mechanisms of the CWC.

The situation for the BTWC is much less certain; there is no basis on which to conclude that it is any better, and it is likely to be worse. Nonetheless, there is widespread recognition of the importance of all states parties adopting national legislation. The adoption of Security Council resolution 1540

Table 3. National implementation measures submitted to the OPCW, 1997–2005

Date	Number of states parties	Number (and percentage) of state parties that have submitted national implementation measures	Legislation covers area key to the enforcement of the CWC
May 1997	87	0 (0%)	Not available
December 1997	103	24 (23%)	Not available
November 1998	120	40 (33%)	Not available
July 1999	125	43 (34%)	Not available
May 2000	133	48 (36%)	Not available
May 2001	143	53 (38%)	Not available
October 2002	145	70 (48%)	39 (27%)
October 2003	154	94 (61%)	51 (33%)
November 2004	166	96 (58%)	52 (31%)
November 2005	174	106 (61%)	59 (34%)

Sources: Scott Spence, 2005, *Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC Experience*, Review Conference Paper no. 13, University of Bradford; Santiago Oñate, Ralf Trapp and Lisa Tabassi, 2005, "Decision on the Follow-up to the OPCW Action Plan on Article VII: Ensuring the Effective Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention", *The CBW Conventions Bulletin*, nos. 69 and 70, September–December, pp. 5–10.

(2004) on 28 April 2004 has provided additional impetus for all states—not solely the states party to the BTWC—to adopt national legislation, as it decides that:

all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or *biological* weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them[.] [Emphasis added.]¹⁴

However, it needs to be noted that resolution 1540 does not address the element in Article IV requiring each state party to take necessary measures to "prevent". By definition this means that national measures must do more than merely prohibit forbidden activities, therefore the Sixth Review Conference needs to address both prohibition and prevention. The prevention requirement is valuable in that it sets a high standard for national implementation measures for the BTWC, making it a useful test of their effectiveness. If a state party's legislative and other prohibitions are not strong enough to *prevent* those activities involving biological weapons defined in Article I of the convention, that state party accordingly risks falling short of full compliance. It would be desirable for the Review Conference's Final Declaration to express a common understanding of the significance of the prevention criterion and to recommend that states parties take action by reviewing the effectiveness of their national implementation measures in meeting the prevention criterion.

There is a need to go further than simply adopting an exhortation along the lines of those of previous review conferences. It is appreciated that the action plan followed by the OPCW has called on significant resources, which currently are not available to the BTWC, but action is required to adopt national legislation in order to counter the continuing threat posed by biological and toxin weapons, whether by states or by non-state actors. As recognized by resolution 1540, states may require assistance with implementation. The 2006 report of the 1540 Committee recommended that the Security Council "substantially widen and intensify regional and subregional outreach activities" and invited "both States making offers of assistance and States requesting assistance to take a proactive approach on a bilateral basis, including making use of

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offers by international organizations, in order to contribute to capacity-building".¹⁵ Consequently, at the Sixth Review Conference, a commitment should be sought from states parties that are able to provide such assistance.

Some states parties already offer assistance. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office is funding the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre's project on national implementation measures, Australia and Indonesia hosted seminars in 2005 and 2006 respectively for the Asia-Pacific region and the United States has been providing bilateral assistance to states parties and has recently provided US\$ 500,000 to Interpol's bio-criminalization project. The EU Council Joint Action of 2006, mentioned above, also contributed to national implementation measures by allocating EUR 277,000 to an assistance project. Under the Joint Action, the EU will support assistance visits to BTWC states parties to address the drafting of national legislation to implement the convention. In addition, the EU has adopted a Joint Action specifically in support of resolution 1540, under which the EU will support awareness-raising seminars in three regions (Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America and the Caribbean), possibly leading to the provision of technical assistance.¹⁶ The first such seminar took place in Beijing on 12–13 July 2006.

Although BTWC states parties may consider adopting an action plan, it would be wise to use different terminology, as the resources available to the OPCW simply do not exist for the BTWC. It is suggested that a timeline, with a target of two-thirds of BTWC states parties having adopted national implementation legislation by the time of the Seventh Review Conference, would be an effective and desirable outcome. This would be greatly aided by one or more states parties undertaking to continue providing resources to facilitate the adoption of legislation as well as to monitor and report annually to states parties on progress toward this target. A number of states parties and international organizations are now involved in national implementation of the BTWC and it will be essential to ensure that their efforts are coordinated. Future annual meetings of states parties could offer a convenient venue for such coordination to be planned and for progress to be reported. Where appropriate, such meetings could also agree any necessary additional action.

Enhancing the confidence-building measures

BTWC states parties agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986 to submit information annually under confidence-building measures (CBMs). The CBMs were reviewed and extended at the Third Review Conference in 1991 "in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities".¹⁷ It has, however, long been evident that annual participation has been poor—typically by less than one-third of BTWC states parties.¹⁸

More attention is now being focused on CBMs. In March 2006 the European Union adopted an action plan to revitalize interest in and use of CBMs: as a starting point, it will ensure that all its member states report annually on the current nine CBM topics.¹⁹ In April 2006 Canada submitted specific proposals to the Preparatory Committee for the Sixth Review Conference; and back in 2001 South Africa submitted a number of useful proposals to strengthen the CBMs to the Fifth Review Conference.²⁰ These proposals should be included in an overall review that examines: the existing CBMs and their format; proposals for new CBMs; provision for electronic submission and circulation; collation, translation and elaboration procedures; and the provision of assistance, where requested.

However, there may not be time at the Sixth Review Conference to consider the CBMs in this kind of detail. At the Second Review Conference in 1986 the states parties agreed to hold an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from states parties to finalize the modalities for the exchange

of information and data. At the Sixth Review Conference, states parties could agree to hold a meeting of states parties in 2007 to consider and decide how to improve the effectiveness of the CBM process. The meeting could be preceded by a meeting of experts, at which states parties could share best practice in compiling CBM returns and identify how the effectiveness of the CBM process might be improved.

Investigations of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons

The Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 mentions United Nations Security Council resolution 620 (1988), which “[e]ncourages the Secretary-General to carry out promptly investigations in response to allegations brought to his attention by any Member State concerning the possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons”, as well as the technical guidelines and procedures contained in Annex I of United Nations document A/44/561 to guide the Secretary-General on the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use of such weapons.²¹

Subsequently, the BTWC meetings in 2004 considered the enhancement of “international capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease”. In their report they “agreed on the value of”:

- a) continuing to develop their own national capacities for response, investigation and mitigation, in cooperation with the relevant international and regional organisations, and, if in a position to do so, assisting and encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other States Parties to do the same;
- b) the Sixth Review Conference considering, inter alia, the further development of current procedures for the provision of assistance, by those in a position to do so, to States Parties in cases of alleged use of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease.²²

The initial text of the draft outcome paper for this meeting stated that “consideration should be given to reviewing the Secretary General’s mechanism for investigation of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons”. However, consensus could not be found on the language used so all consideration has been deferred to the Sixth Review Conference.²³

States parties should recognize that it is in the interest of all to ensure that investigations are both effective and credible. Consequently, the Sixth Review Conference should consider what steps are needed to make the Secretary-General’s mechanism effective and credible. There have been significant

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developments in investigating the use of chemical and biological weapons since the mechanism was established in 1988: the OPCW now has its own mechanism for the investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission has developed its procedures. In both cases, the importance of trained experts and accredited laboratories with validated procedures for the analysis of samples has been recognized. The Secretary-General’s mechanism has neither and is therefore seriously lagging behind the current international standard. The European Union is conscious of the need to review and update the mechanism, and has committed to volunteering expertise to the Secretary-General.²⁴

At the Sixth Review Conference the states parties should agree to hold an annual meeting of experts and then of states parties during 2007–2010 to finalize the modalities for the timely and

effective investigation of the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons. It should be clearly understood that the meeting of states parties will have the authority to adopt the procedures agreed.

Further annual meetings in 2007–2010

Key to providing impetus to the CWC action plans and continued pressure on CWC states parties have been the annual sessions of the Conference of the States Parties. They offer an opportunity to take stock, as well as to identify states parties requiring assistance and provide deadlines within which remedial action should be taken. An essential prerequisite for the most effective implementation of the proposals above is therefore a further series of annual meetings of BTWC states parties in the years prior to the Seventh Review Conference.

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The annual meetings of states parties prepared by separate two-week meetings of experts held in 2003, 2004 and 2005 have been effective; there has been much sharing of information about different national approaches and common understandings have been identified. However, there has been no agreement or implementation of any effective action as the states parties have deferred such consideration to the Sixth Review Conference.

The states parties at the Sixth Review Conference should agree to hold further annual meetings of states parties in 2007–2010, but this time ensure that decisions can be taken at these meetings. The meetings should consider topics arising from the Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference. Thus, as proposed above, the meeting of states parties in 2007 could agree and adopt the modalities for improved confidence-building measures and a subsequent meeting of states parties could agree and adopt procedures for the timely and effective investigation of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.

The annual meetings of states parties could also consider progress reports and take action on the achievement of universal adherence to the BTWC, and the status of national implementation measures. There would be benefit in using the annual meetings to consider the progress made on two of the topics addressed in 2003–2005: the national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; and the content, promulgation and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists.

Insofar as new topics, similar to those considered in 2003–2005, are concerned, it is suggested that these could usefully include the development of procedures for the provision of timely emergency assistance to states parties on request and procedures to facilitate international cooperation between states parties—this might include the development and adoption of a confidence-building measure to enhance the transparency of cooperation between states parties under Article X of the convention (on the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes). The experience gained in the annual series of meetings of 2003–2005 indicates that all of the above is feasible for a series of four annual meetings in 2007–2010.

Conclusions

The Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC is just a starting point for much concerted action by the states parties to carry forward the agreements reached at the conference so that they are implemented effectively and efficiently to yield concrete results.

Although relevant experience from similar activities under the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty can be usefully drawn upon, the steps taken to achieve the commitments made at the Sixth Review Conference need to be tailored to the particular circumstances of the BTWC. This article shows that, by taking certain decisions at the Sixth Review Conference, significant benefits to all states parties can be achieved: universal adherence to the convention, improved national implementation of the convention, enhanced quality of and participation in CBMs, a strengthened mechanism for investigating the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons, and a further programme of annual meetings during the intersessional period leading up to the Seventh Review Conference. The outcomes addressed in this article are all achievable at the Sixth Review Conference as they are already attracting wide support among states parties. It is evident that achieving them would provide an effective strengthening of the BTWC regime to completely prohibit the use of disease to attack humans, animals or plants.

Notes

1. See for example, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, 2005, *Annual Report 2004–2005*, at <www.asno.dfat.gov.au/annual_report_0405/ASNO_2005_AR.pdf>; *Towards the Sixth BTWC Review Conference: An Accountability Framework. Discussion Paper Prepared by Canada*, UN document BWC/CONF.VI/PC/INF.1, 10 April 2006; Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27 February 2006 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in the Framework of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 65/51, 7 March 2006; and Council Common Position 2006/242/CFSP of 20 March 2006 relating to the 2006 Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 88/65, 25 March 2006, available at <eur-lex.europa.eu>.
2. See, for example, Final Document, Fourth Review Conference, 25 November – 6 December 1996, UN document BWC/CONF.IV/9, under “Article XIV”, at <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/4rc/docs/rev_con_docs/i_docs/IV-09.pdf>.
3. UN document A/RES/60/96, 5 January 2006.
4. Full title: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, at <www.opcw.org>.
5. Report of the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review Conference), document RC-1/5, 9 May 2003, paragraph 7.18, at <www.opcw.org/docs/rc105.pdf>.
6. The action plan is reproduced in Annex II of Scott Spence, 2005, *Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC Experience*, Review Conference Paper no. 13, University of Bradford, at <www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/RCP_13.pdf>.
7. Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Activities Undertaken by Signatory and Ratifying States Under Measure (k) of the Final Declaration of the 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT in the Period September 2003–September 2005, document CTBT–Art.XIV/2005/4, 16 September 2005, p. 18. For more details of the CWC and CTBT experiences, see Daniel Feakes, 2006, “Practical Steps for Accelerating BWC Universality”, *Disarmament Diplomacy* 82, Spring, at <www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd82/82df.htm>.
8. Council Joint Action 2006/184/CFSP of 27 February 2006, see note 1.
9. See, for example, Final Document, Fourth Review Conference, 25 November–6 December 1996, UN document BWC/CONF.IV/9, available at <www.opbw.org>.
10. See, for example, VERTIC, 2003, *Time to Lay Down the Law: National Legislation to Enforce the BWC*, London, at <www.vertic.org/assets/Time%20to%20lay%20down%20the%20law%20-%20final%20report.PDF>.
11. Report of the First Review Conference, document RC-1/5, 9 May 2003, paragraph 7.83, at <www.opcw.org/docs/rc105.pdf>.
12. Decision: Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations, Eighth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, document C-8/DEC.16, 24 October 2003, at <www.opcw.org/docs/csp8/en/c8dec16.pdf>.
13. Decision: Follow-up to the Plan of Action Regarding the Implementation of Article VII Obligations, Tenth Session of the Conference of the States Parties, document C-10/DEC.16, 11 November 2005, at <www.opcw.org/docs/csp10/en/c10dec16.pdf>.
14. United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, UN document S/RES/1540(2004), 28 April 2004. On 27 April 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1673 (2006), which renewed the

- mandate of the committee established by resolution 1540 for a further two years and decided that the committee should intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1540.
15. *Report of the Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004)*, in UN document S/2006/257, 25 April 2006, paragraph 136.
 16. Council Joint Action 2006/419/CFSP of 12 June 2006, *Official Journal of the European Union*, L 165/30, 17 June 2006, at <eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_165/l_16520060617en00300034.pdf>.
 17. Final Document, Third Review Conference, 9–27 September 1991, UN document BWC/CONF.III/23, Part II, at <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/3rc/docs/final_dec/3RC_final_dec_E.pdf>.
 18. François Rivasseau, Speaking notes, QUNO/University of Bradford Seminar, Geneva, 26 April 2006; see also the article by Iris Hunger and Nicolas Isla in this issue of *Disarmament Forum*.
 19. EU Action Plan on Biological and Toxin Weapons, Complementary to the EU Joint Action in Support of the BTWC, 2006/C 57/01, *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 57/1, 9 March 2006, at <eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_057/c_05720060309en00010002.pdf>.
 20. *Strengthening Confidence-Building Measures: Working Paper by South Africa*, UN document BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.1, 16 November 2001, at <www.opbw.org/rev_cons/5rc/docs/rev_con_docs/cow/COW-WP.01.pdf>; *Towards the Sixth BTWC Review Conference: An Accountability Framework. Discussion Paper Prepared by Canada*, see note 1.
 21. Final Document, Fourth Review Conference, op. cit.; United Nations Security Council resolution 620 (1988) of 26 August 1988, UN document S/RES/620(1988), 26 August 1988.
 22. *Report of the Meeting of States Parties*, UN document BWC/MSP/2004/3, 14 December 2004, paragraph 21, at <www.opbw.org/new_process/msp2004/BWC_MSP_2004_3_E.pdf>.
 23. Graham S. Pearson, 2004, “The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties”, *The CBW Conventions Bulletin*, no. 66, December, pp. 21–34, at <www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/CBWC66.pdf>.
 24. EU Action Plan on Biological and Toxin Weapons, op. cit.