Does the U.S. Have a New Biological Weapon Control Policy?

Posted by Alan Pearson at 6:45 pm on December 1, 2006

John Gilbert, a senior fellow at the Center for Arms Control and a member of our Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons wants to know the answer to this question.  He writes:

Last week (on November 24, 2006), the U.S. Government tabled a paper at the BWC Review Conference titled “Confronting Noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.” In the paper, the U.S. specifically accuses Iran, Syria, and North Korea of failing to comply with the BWC’s prohibitions. Specifically, the paper says that the U.S. believes Iran “has an offensive biological weapons program”, North Korea “has a biological warfare capability”, and Syria “has conducted research and development for an offensive BW program”. The paper also states the U.S. Government’s belief that North Korea “may have developed, produced, and weaponized for use biological weapons”. Given such a strong denouncement and the aggressive title of the paper, it could appear that the U.S. Government is proposing a new policy of “bio-confrontation”.

However, nowhere in the four pages of text is there a clear explanation of what “confronting noncompliance” is intended to mean or if this really is as clear a policy statement as the title suggests. At various times the paper says that a variety of “confrontational” actions should be taken, including direct discussions, diplomacy, and what is called “attribution response” (which appears to mean “figuring out who conducted a BW attack”). In developing ideas about “attribution response”, the U.S. paper advocates three options – request the UN Secretary General to launch an investigation, engage the World Health Organization (WHO), or deploy a NATO “CBRN defense battalion” to investigate allegations of BW use. In addition, the paper also calls on states to do things individually, such as “terminate their offensive biological weapons programs immediately”, develop their own ways of detecting BWC noncompliance, submit their already-required Confidence Building Measures annual declarations, and work with the WHO, UN Food and Agricultural Organization, and another international organization to strengthen collective public health and agricultural systems.

None of this appears to be new or unique and builds on measures many states (including the U.S.) have been pursuing for years. However, it still is difficult to understand the real significance of this aggressively titled paper. I’m certain that many would appreciate some clarification.

I’d like some clarification too.  And I’d like to know why the U.S. continues to resist engaging in discussions of ways to pursue non-compliance concerns within the BWC, or ways to strengthen the UN Secretary General’s investigation and inspection capabilities so that’s the US recommendations could actually be carried out.  This looks like a lot of smoke, and little fire.

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