As the BWC Review Conference ended its second week, negotiators face increasing pressure to arrive at a final outcome that all can accept. A draft final declaration now exists, and negotiations will henceforth focus on specific highlighted problem areas within the text. Reports are that many such problem areas exist, but two stand out above all others: the topics of the 2007 – 2010 inter-sessional meetings, and how to address Article X relating to facilitating peaceful cooperation and peaceful uses of biotechnology. Not surprisingly, these two issues are connected.

On Friday, the BioWeapons Prevention Project reported that eleven possible topics for single inter-sessional meetings were on the table for discussion, together with four potential recurring topics “which could not be expected to be dealt with in a single year as some form of progress report or update may be considered beneficial.” With only four inter-sessional meetings, and with action plans on universality and national implementation to be re-visited every year, it is clear that this list needs to be narrowed down. That’s where there is a lot of tension and debate. These topics are listed here, together with a brief discussion of their limitations.

One of the eleven potential topics is “Facilitation of, and removal of restrictions or limitations on, scientific and technological cooperation and exchange, including in the field of biotechnology, for peaceful purposes in pursuance of Article X.” In addition, the NAM has formally proposed language for an action plan on Article X, analogous to the action plans on universality and national implementation that appear to be moving forward.

However, the Western Group, and the U.S. in particular, does not want to see much discussion of Article X during the inter-sessional process other than the topic of cooperation on infectious disease surveillance, and it will certainly reject any action plan on the issue. It’s clear that many in the NAM do not feel that discussion of infectious disease surveillance alone is good enough. Indeed, the NAM working paper on inter-sessional meetings views that topic as being distinct from the facilitation of “scientific and technological cooperation and exchanges for peaceful purposes in pursuance of Article X.” (It should be said, however, that there are apparently disagreements within the NAM on this issue.)

Some background may help to clarify this issue. Jean Pascal Zanders offers a cogent summary:

The connection between disarmament and development is another source of tension permanently present in the efforts to strengthen the BTWC. … In the 1990s it caused increasing polarization between the developed and developing world. With regard to BW there was a marked shift from disarmament to non-proliferation. … To the industrialized states the shift was uncontroversial, perhaps even natural: since there are no BW to destroy, security policies should aim to prevent technologies that may contribute to BW development and production [from] fall[ing] in the hands of certain state and non-state actors.

Non-proliferation policies are a requirement under Article III of the BTWC; legislative or regulatory measures to implement these policies are required under article IV. The concrete measures, however, are not developed within the treaty framework. The Australia Group is an informal coalition of select states that coordinate technology export control measures and standards among themselves. It is exclusive, as new members have to be invited in. This opaque decision-making and exclusivity generate suspicion about the true intentions among non-participants, who are often developing countries. Developing countries have viewed the emphasis on export controls as yet another attempt by the industrialized world to preserve their economic dominance and technological edge at their expense. The globalizing economy, and the growing importance of biology and biotechnology for economic and societal development, have reinforced their demands for access to technology.” (p. 26-7)

In short, the Western group sees the NAM attempting to use the BWC to inappropriately gain access to technology (which it fears may then be copied or stolen), while the NAM sees the Western group as using non-proliferation concerns and export controls to inappropriately deny access to technology. Widely expressed Western concerns that the global spread of biotechnology is increasing the biological weapons threat probably do little to reduce the concerns of developing nations.

The NAM concerns are understandable, at least in the abstract. In fact, a counterpart of sorts exists in Western nations, where concerns are being expressed that efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons could unduly impede scientific and technological advance. (Whether either set of concerns has a basis in fact is a separate issue, one that has little impact on the political debate.)

This problem is not going to go away. Indeed, the problem is arising outside of the BWC as well. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s proposed global forum on biotechnology is centered precisely on the issue of how “to ensure that biotechnology’s advances are used for the public good and that the benefits are shared equitably around the world” while at the same time managing potential risks. According to Annan, the first goal requires “making technologies available, encouraging transparency and promoting a cooperative environment,” while the second requires “a global framework to mitigate potential risks … a subject crying out for a focused global debate.”

The outcome of the Review Conference now appears to depend, more than anything else, on the ability of diplomats to find a way to accommodate the disagreements in this area. When the EU puts forward a position on Article X that “States Parties should recognize that effective national implementation of the Convention worldwide is essential to fully harness the vast potential of biology for peaceful purposes,” the NAM is likely to balk unless it feels that its concerns are also addressed.

If the NAM does not give up its insistence on an action plan, and the Western Group does not allow any inter-sessional meeting related to Article X to go beyond the issue of disease surveillance, the Review Conference may fail. My guess is that no-one wants that to happen, so some sort of compromise will be found. And in the long run, there is a bigger issue at hand. As South Korea discussed in its paper on universalization (and the same can be said as well for national implementation, for fulfillment of UNSC Resolution 1540 obligations, or for Secretary General Annan’s Forum)

Generally speaking, there are two potential benefits from accession to the BWC membership: security and economic. … The economic benefits emanate from increased cooperation in the peaceful uses of biotechnology.

Some non-Parties may have been hesitant to join the BWC as there are no significant economic benefits relative to the cost of implementation. … More specific programs for the implementation of Article X of the Convention on international cooperation need to be developed.

The EU may be open to finding a solution, as it also stated that

The review of the operation of Article X in subsequent Review Conferences would benefit from more comprehensive information on the implementation of Article X, including needs identified and efforts undertaken by States Parties. States Parties should share this information with other States Parties on a voluntary basis with the Secretariat facilitating this information exchange.

However, the EU has not yet proposed any topics related to Article X that could be said to address core NAM concerns, at least publicly.

To my mind, the best opportunity for a solution is a proposal offered by South Africa, which calls for an inter-sessional meeting on the topic “discussion and examination of the means for improving international cooperation in the use of biotechnology for peaceful purposes.” The generality of the proposal, and the opportunity it would allow for new ideas and approaches to surface, is what makes it useful. The problem is that the Western Group will resist a general approach, while some members of the NAM will want to add a specific reference to “transfer of technology, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, particularly with countries less advanced in this field,” as stated in the NAM paper on Article X.

It’s going to be a long week.