The Chair of our Scientists Working Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons, Dr. Marie Chevrier, traveled to Geneva this week for a lunchtime seminar for BWC Conference delegates on strengthening the BWC by enhancing transparency (advert: we co-sponsored this seminar with the Hamburg Research Group for Biological Arms Control.) She has this to say about the events of Monday and Tuesday:

The second week of the BWC Review Conference seems to be proceeding with little acrimony. As of noon on Tuesday the States Parties had collectively gone through an article by article first reading of the President’s draft Final Declaration. [What this probably means is that the States Parties have agreed in principle on the contents of the Final Declaration, but that a lot of details still need to be worked out - AP] There seems to be no opposition to an inter-sessional process, an “institutional support unit” (ISU) or work plans.

The format of the inter-sessional process is likely to be similar or identical to that of the last three years—meetings of experts followed by meetings of the States Parties. The topics of the inter-sessional meetings have not been decided; a large range of topics is being considered. There is disagreement on whether the inter-sessional meetings will be empowered to take any decisions. Two comments have been heard. One is that the meetings, like those of the last three years, will not take decisions and will issue factual reports only. The other is that the Final Declaration will be silent on whether the meetings can take decisions. This could open the door to decision making, but not specifically empower it.

Article X (peaceful uses of biotechnology) remains controversial. There will be informal meetings today on Article X issues open to States Parties. At the present time the NAM wants more action on Article X, but the EU, USA and the Jackson’s appear to be resisting. It remains to be seen whether the NAM can mount a successful effort to have Article X on the intersessional agenda. It seems unlikely. [For a description of these groupings, see here.]

BWPP reports that the scheduled Tuesday afternoon meeting of the Committee of the Whole was suspended to allow for further consultation on Article X in a separate meeting – another indication of the tension around this issue. Indeed, it has been clear for some time that Article X related issues would be a major source of contention at the Review Conference. As a matter of ensuring equity and ownership, the States Parties need to find a way to include Article X related issues on the inter-sessional agenda lest they end up with an ineffective inter-sessional process, or worse, no inter-sessional process at all.

Marie also reports that

discussions on CBMs seems to be primarily on increasing participation with existing CBMs and facilitating submission to make it easier for States Parties to complete and easier for others to interpret or analyze the submissions. There does not seem to be any discussion of new CBM topics.

Increasing participation in the CBMs is absolutely essential – but at the same time there should also be a thorough examination of their content. The last thing we need is 155 States Parties going through the effort of obtaining, assembling and submitting information that is irrelevant to today’s threats and challenges! Unfortunately, many States Parties are resisting an examination of CBM content – if there is nothing else they can agree on, they can agree on this! It’s time for the U.S. to show some leadership on this issue – but alas all reports are that the U.S. is no more interested than such paragons of transparency as Russia and China.

As for the “ISU”, Marie reports that

while there is support for an ISU, the size of the unit will depend on the mandate given to the unit by the Conference. A three or possibly four person support unit [BWPP says the most likely size is three] seems to be under consideration even before a mandate for the unit is established. A danger could emerge that the size of the unit will be too small to successfully fulfill an ambitious mandate.

The BWPP similarly notes that

compared with implementation support efforts elsewhere [such as the Chemical Weapons Convention], this is an extremely modest provision … Care must be taken not to mandate an implementation support unit with more tasks than could be carried out with the available staff time.

Such care would not be needed if the States Parties weren’t approaching this issue backwards. A serious approach would be for States Parties to decide on the mandate (i.e., what it is that they want to accomplish) first, and then develop the institutional support required. We said as much in our statement to the Review Conference last week – but then, who listens to NGOs?

The BWPP also notes that “although the United States had been the State Party to be convinced about the creation of an implementation support unit, this situation has now been largely resolved and there are now other States Parties, such as Japan, raising concerns about costs.” Round and round we go. States Parties can do better.

It should be understood that our information is based on what those behind the closed doors tell us. But the BWPP reports that

participants in the closed sessions describe what is going on in the meeting room in substantially contradictory ways. It is quite possible that there is no individual who has a clear idea of what the whole Review Conference … looks like. It is also becoming a concern to some delegates that they feel they do not have a full picture of what is going [on].

Indeed, from the initial expressions of concern that the Review Conference was proceeding too smoothly, we are now hearing additional concerns about the process. For instance, the BWPP reports that traditional approaches “appear to be operating too slowly to contend with the pace of the Conference. Once new text is agreed by a group it is sometimes out of date by the time it is available for consideration by all States Parties.” And it reports that there is tension between technical advisors and diplomats arising from the speed of activities within the Review Conference.

It seems clear that the BWC is inventing new ways of operating – at this point we can only wait and see whether they will strengthen the treaty and enhance efforts to counter the threat of biological weapons.