The Review Conference has entered the final stretch – and evening meetings are now on the schedule.  The amount of information coming out from behind the closed doors is decreasing, but what information there is suggests that negotiations remain intense.

“Article X remains the key outstanding issue that divides States Parties” writes the BioWeapons Prevention Project today.  BWPP offers another, perhaps more positive take on this issue, which was discussed extensively in my previous blog:

A number of the divisions on Article X stem from differing visions of the role of the BTWC. The differing visions can be divided into two groups which are broadly those which are net exporters of technology and those that are net importers.

One group of States, and these generally have a strong technological base, see the role of the BTWC as primarily one for controlling the spread of potentially harmful materials and technologies, and, while they see Article X as an important part of the Convention, they perceive economic and development issues as being better discussed in other forums.

The other group of States, which generally see scientific and technological development as key to future progress for their countries, have concerns that economic and development issues are not taken seriously enough in international negotiations. To these States, it is important that issues relating to national security do not have a negative impact on economic security or development.

From a slightly different perspective, all States see the benefits of assistance activities which clearly fall within the remit of Article X, such as enhanced disease surveillance, the education of scientists and improvements of biosafety and biosecurity in laboratory facilities.

BWPP also noted yesterday a development which we had overlooked with regard to CBMs:

The draft declaration includes the sentence: ‘The information supplied by a State Party must not be further circulated or made available without the express permission of that State Party’ – a text that comes from a proposal by Russia, the UK and the US (the depositary powers of the BTWC, the latter two of which have published parts of their CBMs).

BWPP notes that CBM returns have been studied by independent researchers.  Indeed, our colleagues at the Hamburg Research Group for Biological Arms Control have been examining them closely for the last couple of years and have written extensively on the topic.  The Sunshine Project has also conducted studies which compare the content of CBM returns to information available through open-sources.

If the proposed wording goes through, these possibilities for outside assessment would be significantly curtailed.  Unless coupled to a serious effort by States Parties to address compliance concerns (which, as we have discussed, is simply not being contemplated), this move may decrease the accountability of States Parties to each other and to their own citizens.